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S A N C T IO N S
In the realm of international relations, there is an instrument of policy which
combines economics and politics in both intent and outcome. It also says a lot about the
polarity of any particular time period. Sanctions are a foreign policy tool used by nations
to shape the behavior of another country; they come in several forms. In this analysis we
will consider 3 sets of issues: The first question to explore is how sanctions work and
how are they enforced. The second question is how and can, sanctions be examined and
evaluated; that is, what framework should be used to analyze the effectiveness of
sanctions? Does the use of such a framework make it possible to describe and explain the
overall outcomes of the sanctions? The third component of this research looks at what
sanctions imply about the international political and economic polarity of a particular
time period. Such a combination of questions can be used to elaborate and evaluate how
best to use sanctions to achieve the desired goals in particular circumstances. To facilitate
the answers to these questions I adopted a modified framework to analyze the efficacy of
sanctions and what implications this has for the ongoing polarity shift the world is going
through.
The term ‘Sanctions’ is defined in many ways but the two definitions I will use
will be from the Oxford English Dictionary and one proposed by the legal and political
philosopher, Hans Kelsen. Kelsen defines sanctions in a wider sense as any measure
taken in support of a social order regulating human behavior so as to prevent a particular
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behavior that is inconsistent with the goals and standards of a particular world.1 The
Oxford English Dictionary definition which is used by many sanction academia and
politicians, states that ‘Sanctions’ are (a) ‘specific penalties enacted in order to enforce
obedience to a law’. And (b) ‘considerations which operate to enforce obedience to any
law or rule of conduct; a recognized motive for conformity to moral or religious law,
operating either through the agents desire for some resultant good or through his fear of
some resultant evil’. These definitions are similar and both get to the main purpose of
this paper. Sanctions are currently used as an alternative to war because they are
perceived to cut costs and get the results the victorious nation would want to see
implemented. The best examples would be Japan and Germany. Defeating these two
nations cost Europe and the United States so much money and resources. While the war
efforts of World War II were necessary to dispose of Hitler, it could have been cheaper to
use sanctions and restrict the rise of the two superpowers. However, as will be elaborated
later, this would not have been easy because the world at this time was multipolar and
both Japan and Germany had strong economies almost on equal terms with the United
States.
It is clear that sanctions have to be enforced by an ‘imposing’ country or actor,
and received by a ‘sender’ country or actor. The imposing actor is often the United
Nations but the United States is the main actor that usually has the main say on sanctions
that are deemed necessary since it is the country that has the military capability to police
the international waters as well as the economic muscle to influence the financial markets.

1 Sanctions, International. “International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences” Gale Virtual Library
2 Miyagawa, Makio. Do Economic Sanctions Work? Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan,
1992.
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This has been true since the end of World War II but even more so after the collapse of
the Soviet Union in 1989/90 - after the United States became the undisputed Global
power. The United Nations identifies and imposes sanctions on the basis of International
Law and justifies them by including language pertaining to sanctions in the United
Nations Charter which is approved by all member countries. According to the United
Nations Charter - ‘In situations where the UN Security Council has determined the
existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or an act of aggression,
the Charter o f the United Nations (the Charter) authorizes it to decide on measures to be
taken to maintain or restore international peace and security (Charter Article 39).
Members of the United Nations are legally bound to accept and carry out these measures
(Charter Article 25). Those measures that do not involve the use of armed force are
known as "sanctions".” These sanctions are intended to deter any behavior that might
jeopardize the political and economic peace of the world. Sanctions can be enforced
when the five permanent members as well as ten of the rotating temporary member
countries agree to ensure that a country is not committing a threat or breach of peace.
However, the United Nations is usually considered toothless in imposing sanctions
because the five permanent members rarely reach a consensus to impose sanctions on
countries due to national interests. This is why the case studies considered in this paper
will be those that were and still are imposed by the United States. The United States has
the capabilities as well as the resources to implement sanctions without having to reach a
consensus with other countries in the UN. To give an example of one of the obstacles to
achieving a consensus on sanctions is the concept of human rights.

3 UN, "Sanctions." Last modified 2013. Accessed April 4, 2013.
http ://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml.
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The concept of human rights is not internationally accepted by all countries due to
the different traditions and cultures. This is the first roadblock that sanctions must address;
what one country considers as human rights may not be equivalent to those observed in
the country you are imposing sanctions on. This is where the conflict and tension of
sanctions begin to emerge. Both definitions allude to the fact that sanctions ‘prevent a
particular behavior that is inconsistent with the goals and standards of a particular world’4
OR ‘operate either through the imposing agent’s desire for some resultant good or
through the imposing agent’s fear of some resultant evil’.5 In fact, the sanctions enshrined
in an International Law might be deemed biased; they are often set-up by the country that
is currently considered the most powerful both economically and politically. In practice if
sanctions will be to be enforced then everyone must be sure that a strong actor is behind
most of them (the United States). This is important both theoretically and pragmatically;
in addition, what then happens when the actor that has developed and implemented this
tool begins to lose its economic and political clout in a world that is increasingly multi
polar? Do sanctions become less effective and if they do, is there any way they can be
more effective to achieve well intentioned standards for the new multipolar world? In this
study, South Africa, Iran and China will be considered to address these questions.

4 Hans Kelsen
5 Miyagawa et al
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TH E FRAM EW ORK
The framework I will be using is a redesign of what other scholars have already
developed and applied. When sanctions are imposed on a target country there are
objectives that the imposer would like to achieve. These objectives are usually in line
with what the imposer believes are the standards and goals that the target actor has to
conform to. However, those objectives are not the only outputs that the imposer is likely
to observe. There are also other outcomes that manifest that are usually not anticipated or
even if they were, governments have no mechanisms to neutralize them. It is these other
outcomes that from now shall be referred to as consequences, which usually determine
what the final outcomes of a set of sanctions will be. When an actor imposes sanctions
there are three categories I will use to evaluate them: 1) Intended Consequences; 2)
Unintended Consequences and 3) Unexpected Consequences.
Intended Consequences
These are the policy changes governments or organizations wish to see by imposing
sanctions on a particular country. The policy change could be political, economic or
social. Once perceived that a country’s course of action would go against the standards
this world desires then sanctions would be put in place to ensure the country is restrained.
The most preferred outcome by the imposer is that the regimes in a particular country,
especially those that are considered aggressive, leave power to regimes that are more co
operative and willing to compromise on the best course of action. Adopting of ‘friendly’
economic objectives is something that the countries or organizations will want to see so
as to facilitate the ‘globalization’ that the world has come to embrace. Another way of
5

looking at the intended consequences would be the notion that the country that imposes
them is safeguarding the concept of fairness in a world that is advocating the philosophy
of globalization. These intended consequences of sanctions are deemed necessary as the
aim is to establish some form of standards that every country in the world lives by and
where no country has an advantage over the other or takes advantage of its own citizens.
The incentives behind using sanctions are to bring about the desired change suitable to
the standards and goals set by the global power or powers of that particular period. For
the purposes of this research the global power in question will be the United States and
whether or not it can still carry out the principles it wants to promote around the world.

Unintended Consequences
These are the consequences that many political and economic theorists will point out
as the reasons why sanctions either fail or even to some extent actually work. The term
‘unintended’ is the expected, but uncontrollable social behavior of the people who live in
the country that has been hit with economic sanctions. The premise upon which the
intended consequences of sanctions are based; are the fact that a government will adjust
its policies to the tune of the countries imposing the sanctions so as not to make its own
people suffer (since every country is, at its core, nationalistic). The countries
implementing the sanctions expect to see the people within the country pressure the
current government into complying with what the international community asks of it.
However, as much as this behavior is expected the one thing the outside actors don’t have
control of is the ability to control the particular behavior that they have generated.

6

This is where the unintended consequences then begin to arise and the results can be
twofold; 1) the behavior generated, can without a doubt, push out the current government
but how far they are willing go is something no-one knows. This means that the populous
can indeed bring about change but whether or not they will be peaceful is a question that
cannot be controlled by the actors that imposed the sanctions. This might even bring
about the springing up of rival factions within a country due to the different opinions that
may arise due to the effects of the sanctions. This leads to an ethnic, religious or tribal
divide that divides the country even further and possibly initiate a civil war with radical
actors who are unable to reach a compromise on the way forward. The other possibility is
you might have a full blown conflict that the outside actors might have to get involved in
to ensure the very same reason they imposed sanctions in the first place - ‘maintain or
restore international peace and security.’
2) The intended behavior generated could be used by the government of the day to
create sovereign resistance against the sanctions imposed against the country. This is
known as the ‘rally-round-the-flag-effect’6 - this is where the government facing the
sanctions cultivates the spirit of nationalism and uses the behavior generated by the
sanctions to point out that they are meant to undermine the country’s advancement. If this
is done strategically by the condemned government; compliance of the sanctions at this
point is virtually impossible. At the core of unintended consequences is the analysis of
the composition and welfare of the country or countries that are faced with sanctions and
how the intended behavior generated is controlled or tamed.

6 Verdier, Daniel, and Byungwon Woo. 2011. "Why Rewards Are Better Than Sanctions." Economics A n d
Politics 23, no. 2: 220-238.
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Unexpected Consequences
This is the part of the framework that completes and verifies whether or not
sanctions do the job they are supposed to do or escalate the situation into an
uncontrollable conundrum. So as not to confuse the readers between unexpected and
unintended consequences let me elaborate exactly what unexpected pertains to.
Throughout the paper ‘unexpected’ will constitute of the effects sanctions have that 1)
affect the imposer’s businesses, multi-national organizations and key economic and
political players and 2) the broader implications the sanctions have that the actors who
executed them didn’t add to their equations. These broader implications will usually
involve the region that the country facing sanctions is located in. But as observed recently
and something that will be explained further; a government shut down or even severe
gridlock in an imposer’s political system such as the United States could be detrimental
to the effectiveness of sanctions.
Another thing about sanctions is that the imposers seem to ‘ignore’ is that
countries faced with sanctions do business with companies located within the imposing
country. This indirectly affects these companies that are unlikely to know how a set of
n

sanctions can affect their business. In addition, many private businesses that are located
within the countries that impose sanctions such as the United States, don’t know they
o

have broken the law until they receive million dollar lawsuits. Some companies do
business the ‘ostrich way’ :9 they decide not to research international compliance laws
with the view that if they do not know they probably won’t get in trouble or that the
7 Trip Mackintosh Trade Sanctions Lawyer), Talk, Holland and Hart"Effects o f Economic Sanctions on
American Businesses," 2013
8 Mackintosh, "Effects o f Economic Sanctions on American Businesses," 2013.
9 ibid
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particular product they deal with is not subject to those particular sanctioning laws and
regulations. There are a number of different regulations concerning with whom a
company can trade. Overlooking any regulation could cost a company more than money
but also its credibility to many of its customers as it has to hand over lots of confidential
information so as to clear its name.10
A final aspect to the equation of what sanctions might do is when imposers decide
not to take into consideration the dynamics of the country’s location and the region it is in.
If a country is burdened with strict sanctions and yet is a powerhouse in the region how
are the other countries in that region supposed to respond to those who initiate the
sanctions. These unexpected consequences raise problems that imposers may not have
considered or thought that they would not affect projected outcomes in several ways.

10 Mackintosh , "Effects o f Economic Sanctions on American Businesses," 2013
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IN TER N A TIO N A L LA W
To fully understand how sanctions function, we have to look at how they are
enshrined in International Law. International Law is a system of law which primarily
governs the relations between states. But also dictates relations between international
organizations, companies and individuals.11 International Law sources its power from
international conventions establishing rules expressly recognized by contesting states,
international customs, general principles of law recognized by civilized nations and from
judicial decisions and teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various
nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.

12

Strictly speaking the

current laws concerning human rights, economic integration and political collaboration
reflect a western philosophy of law related to the whole world’s view on what should be
right or wrong. Just like sanctions, International Law seems to be designed by nations
that have the most abundant resources at their disposal. In addition, when International
Law is differentiated than a specific country’s constitution it is particularly hard to
enforce. This raises significant questions about when the ‘Law’ has been broken.
International Law is respected far more than most people think; not because of the
fear of sanctions, but because every country is entitled to retaliate if it has been wronged
by another nation

13

- this is actually enshrined in international law. At the same time, this

misconception of countries disregarding international law is often exacerbated when

11 Malanczuk, Peter, and Michael Barton. Akehurst. Akehurst'sM odern Introduction to International Law.
London: Routledge, 1997.
12 Slomanson, William R. Fundamental Perspectives on International Law. South Melbourne ; Belmont,
Calif. ; London: Thomson West, 2003.
13 Malnczuk, Michael, “A modern Introduction to International Law”, p. 11.
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powerful countries ignore it in the name of their national security or interests. Examples
would be when the United States invaded Iraq and when Russia annexed northern
Georgia. To make things worse, it is common to observe a number of minor wars all over
the globe addressing domestic problems such as border, ethnicity, religion and domestic
issues. These problems must also be handled within the framework of international law.
International law is violated when the countries involved begin to use means that are
outside the scope of reasonable retaliation. The concept of a ‘Just War’ and a
proportional response to a crisis between countries or a government and its people, plays
a key role in establishing what the international community would constitute as
reasonable retaliation. For example, a civil war is entirely not a violation of international
law; but the use of chemical or nuclear weapons, genocide or blatant violation of human
rights may violate of a mutual understandings among states.
From a world perspective, isolated wars with cycles of retaliation will be
detrimental to every nation. It is much more ‘efficient’ to have a global legislative body
that nations can use to apply some form of punishment against a rogue state, or actors
within that state, that seem intent on bringing political and economic instability that
might affect the world. Most nations will abide by international law most of the time
because the absence of a legislature is paradoxically the source of strength for
international law since it solves the problem of nations having to look at their own laws
to justify particular actions.14 In general, international law is based on generally accepted

14 Slomanson, Fundamental Perspectives on International Law. p. 13
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customs (or a form of etiquette) between nations. Moreover, states cannot live in isolation
in a world where development depends on exchanging ideas15.
Despite the many problems with International Law, the potential use of sanctions
is accepted by most countries in the system because some level of order is required to not
disrupt existing and future mutually beneficial roles (such as trade). When analyzed from
the systematic level, every nation is mercantilist and nationalistic at the core; that is, they
try to maximize their trade surplus and will always put their own interests first. Overall
they try to enrich their own country before they benefit the global economy. With this
attitude in mind, it is necessary for them to abide by international rules because it is likely
to be much cheaper than be in a world where there is constant economic or political
disruption. This is analyzed further by looking at the shift in international economics and
world polarity.

15Slomanson, Fundamental Perspectives on International Law. p. 13
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U N D E R ST A N D IN G T H E E C O N O M IC S
Sanctions are an economic version of war without the need to use military or
physical force against nations that are in violation of a principle of International law.
Understanding the economics that allow sanctions to happen is vital as it explains why
certain countries are unique in the effectiveness of the policies. The economics behind
trade, whether financial, goods or services, and how certain countries use these tools to
impose sanctions are something that has to be explained. Overall, for sanctions to be
effective the country that enforces them either solely or through an organization has to
have a strong economic standing to ensure other countries comply.
World polarity in its different forms from unipolarity to multipolarity depends on
the size and capability of the country or countries involved. At the core of a country’s
ability to control any percentage that determines the nature of the world’s polarity is the
size and strength of its local economy. “All politics are local” - is a saying that carries
weight with regards to why sanctions are imposed and enforced by a country or
organization is capable of doing so. The world’s economy today is largely determined by
the United States and this is because it has been the hegemon since the end of WW II
(and with the Soviet Union in some period before its fall). As the sole hegemon of the
late twentieth and early twenty-first century, the US has promoted the principles of
capitalism and globalization using its economy and military strength. Globalization has
economic principles that it usually follows and it is these principles that make the US and
the other countries that are shifting the world to a multipolar system unique in
determining whether or not sanctions can be effective.
13

The best economic model that explains how countries impose sanctions and affect
world polarity is the Gravity Model. The model states that countries with same or highest
gross domestic product (GDP), relatively same size in terms of exports and imports will
trade with each other more relative to the distance between them16. Others will define the
gravity model for international trade as the volume of trade between any two trading
partners as an increasing function of their national incomes, and decreasing function of
17

the distance between them (Wall, 199) . The generally accepted formula of the gravity
model is as follows:

T a,b = (GDP a)“ x (GDP b)P / (DISTANCE ab)Z18
WHERE:
TA,b - is the value of trade between countries A and B 19
GPD a and GDP b - are the GDP values of each country; which measures the total value
of goods and services produced in an economy 20
DISTANCEAb - The distance between the two countries
a, p, Z - explain the variety of theoretical settings associated with calculations of GDP
and distance. They can also be replaced by a constant A that accounts for the variations.
They are almost always equal or close to equal 1. 21
16 Krugman, Obstfeld & Melitz; International Economics, p.13
17 Yang et al, “US Economic Sanctions against China: Who Gets Hurt?”
18 Chaney, Thomas. The Gravity Equation in International Trade: An Explanation. Master's thesis, Chicago
University, 2011. http://home.uchicago.edu/tchaney/research/Distance.pdf.
19 Krugman, Obstfeld & Melitz; International Economics, p.13
20 ibid
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The gravity model is almost self-explanatory and this paper does not require a
detailed explanation of the model to grasp how this affects sanction. The gravity model
works because large economies will tend to have the money to spend and buy from other
corresponding economies. A large economy also means there is more diversity in the
production of goods and services hence, people in these large economies have more of an
incentive to buy or sell to these different tastes.
The importance of the gravity model is based on looking at the anomalies that are
associated with it, as well as looking at the political impacts these bring about. The
United States, for example, would be a good country to analyze because it is the biggest
imposer of sanctions. As a country with a large economy and trades with everyone in the
world it is very sensitive to those that are its largest export destinations. The US is also
very concerned with countries that have it as their largest import destinations. The US
does not care much for countries that have no impact on its GDP based on the gravity
models predictions. If US trade for the year 2013 is analyzed you get the following graph:
(India and Brazil have been added in for the larger purposes of the paper). The first thing
we notice is that the economies with large economies are all on the list. But crucially the
economies closest to the United States such as Mexico and Canada are in the top three.
China is the anomaly here and this is crucial to understanding how this might affect
sanctions. The emergence of Brazil also speaks volume.

21 Chaney, Thomas. The Gravity Equation in International Trade: An Explanation. p. 2
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Another thing that looks like an anomaly given the gravity model predicts that
only countries with large GDP’s and close in proximity, are more likely to trade, is the
volume of trade between the US and countries with small GDPs. One of the important
underlying incentives to trade with the US is because of the similarity in culture and the
economic influences that are adopted. The United Kingdom, Japan, Hong Kong all work
under the principles of capitalism. They believe in a free market society. At this point the
distance between the US and Hong Kong or Japan become less relevant due to the
economic and political similarities. This is also testament to the US position as a world
power that conquered Japan and basically wrote its constitution after World War II. The
similarity and continued integration through trade also allows multinational companies to
establish offices and headquarters in these countries much more easily compared to
countries that are not democratic or capitalistic.

16
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Due to its huge GDP and trade with other major GDP countries, the US has the
ability to influence the flow of trade to countries that have relatively smaller GDP’s and
where the distance variable of gravity model can has less of an effect. For example, due it
its trade with the many European Union countries the US has an incentive to help its
multinational and private companies that do business there by creating a favorable
environment. This favorable environment is created through legislature, generous loans
through the Export Import Bank of the US and signing trade agreements between regions
or nations. In the case of Mexico and Canada you have North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA). The United States also creates favorable environments in regions
that would be considered risky by encouraging capitalistic policies through the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. These would require countries to
adopt policies that allow private and multinational EU, Japanese and other US major
trading partners’ companies to establish business operations in those regions. All this
would be done with the view to reduce the distance variable that is likely to predict that
trade in those regions would be unfavorable.
From the gravity model and the sample graph, it is also very clear to predict and
conclude that any economic problem in a country with a huge GDP will have some effect
on the countries it trades with. The trade value will reduce if the GDP of any of the two
countries takes a hit due to an economic shock of some sort, for example, the 2008 Great
Recession. The effects are worse when you analyze trade between countries with a large
GDPs trading with countries with smaller GDPs. It is also implicit as well as explicit that
the more economically and politically alike any two countries are the greater the trade

17

value generated. When sanctions are imposed you begin to see a decline in the trade
value.
China is the odd country out when you analyze the major trading partners of the
US. While the size of its GDP is huge and much more likely to trade with the US its
political and economic structure is one that does not compliment the American system of
capitalism. As far as the gravity model goes the only tangible explanation it can give is
that the US and China are major trade partners because of size. This implicitly means that
the US, regardless of how much trade value it has with China, is willing to overlook some
Chinese practices in favor of trade. This economic and political anomaly is important to
take into consideration when the US or China imposes sanctions on other nations because
the effectiveness of sanctions is at risk depending on which country imposes them.
A study was conducted to analyze the impacts of US sanctions on its politics and
economy. The study also included the effects these sanctions implemented by the US had
on its allies, especially the European Union. The observations and results collected were
based on the gravity model application to sanctions. One of the findings was that if the
US decided to impose comprehensive sanctions there was a negative impact on bilateral
22
trade22.
This would have been the case for countries like Iran and Cuba that have smaller

GDPs and find it had to switch countries they can trade with. The other finding was that
trade with other major US partners such as Japan and the EU had been negatively
affected by US sanctions but the countries facing sanctions were not able to improve their
trade value. The researchers pointed out that this was evidence that the sanctions were

22 Yang et al; “U.S Economic Sanctions: An Empirical Study”
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multilateral and its allies helped with the enforcement of the sanctions 23 . From these
findings it is a clear indication that countries that are major trading partners especially
with an identified superpower and have the same economic and political structure will
support the imposing of sanctions.
However, the gravity model also allows us to analyze why certain countries can
affect the effectiveness of sanctions the US or UN imposes because of having a large
GDP. For the GDP of any country to grow it has to increase trade, improve innovation
and become a country that can create a business environment for itself and trading
partners. For the purposes of this thesis, the countries that best epitomize these qualities
are the Brazil, Russia and China. The first thing to observe is that these countries have a
different political and economic structure compared to the US. They do not have to create
the same business environment as the US and do not have to do business in the same
nature as the US. With the World Bank as well as the IMF reporting that these countries
GDP’s are growing
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- this means their stake in international trade is growing too.

The best way to illustrate this would be by giving a short modern case study. The
EU (27 member countries*) trades with Russia which is showing all signals to annex
Crimea. Of the EU’s major trading partners, Russia accounted for 11.9 percent of EU
25

imports and is second only behind China in 2012. Russia accounted for 4.5 percent of
EU exports in fourth position in the same year.26 When Russia sent what they called „selfdefense’ forces to Crimea, the US was the strongest critic among others and suggested
that Russia sanctioned - the call was met with mixed political messages in Europe or
23 Yang et al, “U.S Economic Sanctions: An Empirical Study?”
24 World Bank, IMF
25 European Commission "European Commission Directorate-General for Trade."
26 ibid
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something close to what I would term as ‘European silence’. European leaders were
reluctant to follow in the footsteps of their biggest ally - the US. It was reported by the
European commission that the EU accounted for 75 percent of directed stocks in Russia
and approximately 33 percent of EU’s petroleum imports came from Russia27. The
gravity model would predict exactly the same thing. Complementing the study done by
Yang et al, we know that US sanctions affect allies such as the EU but sometime the
allies simply would not be able to go along with what the US proposes.
In economics, the gravity model can also go further to explain why countries such
as China could refuse to impose sanctions on another country especially if the sanctions
affect trade to the neighboring countries of the target country. If China for example has
economic interests in a landlocked country, for example Zambia, and sanctions are
imposed on Tanzania due to a political clash with the UN or US - then they have every
incentive to veto or ignore those sanctions. On a net-basis, land neighbors are usually
‘innocent bystanders’ who are likely to suffer due to increased transport costs and trade
28

disruptions28 that have a direct negative impact on the total trade value. With growing
GDPs that bring countries together sanctions become much more difficult to enforce or
even impose. The gravity model allows making the connection necessary to
understanding how countries that are in a position to affect world polarity, first need to
have a large GDP. Secondly, the anomalies that arise in analyzing the gravity model then
allow us to access the arguments necessary to be made to substantiate the claims that the
shift is indeed occurring and sanctions imposed are affected.

27 www.dw.de/trade-ties-expose--eu=us=rift-over-russia-sactions/a-17476069
28 Slavov, "Innocent or Not-so-innocent Bystanders: Evidence from the Gravity Model o f International
Trade About the Effects o f U N Sanctions on Neighbour Countries."
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W o r l d P o l a r it y
Polarity is the distribution of power among nations and how this power is used to
29

influence the political and economic actions within the system29. This power comes in the
form of economic and military capabilities of a particular or group of countries. The
system also reflects that ideology the dominant countries of the world adopt for trade and
political arrangements to bring about generally accepted outcomes. To elaborate and
explain the dynamics of polarity I have adopted the realist interpretation. A realist sees
world polarity as evolving and never stagnant. Further, there cannot be a dominant power
without it being challenged by other nations in the world. History has shown that powers
have risen and fallen, usually after being challenged by other countries. The rising and
falling of powers has been dependent on the strength of their economy and the use of
their military around the world. They become the center of trade and can protect interests
that remain the core of the trade. They can also use their military capabilities to enforce
conditions that ensure that their economy is not threatened by other nations, especially
those that that are trying to compete.
There are three types of polarity that can be the basis for the world system,
including its economic and political outcomes. Each of these Balances of Power also has
a direct impact on the effectiveness of sanctions and whether or not the goals of the
imposing actor or actors are accomplished. Put simply, polarity depends on how many
great powers can be identified during any period of time. The identification of these
countries as hegemones is based on how strong their economy, political structure and

29 Thompson, "Polarity, the Long Cycle, and Global Power Warfare."
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military are; and how much they influence the expectations of other countries in the
30

system . The ultimate test is whether the outcomes of interactions with other countries
favor (and protect) their core interests. Such systems can be classified as unipolar (one
power), bi-polar (two powers) or multipolar (three or more powers).
Modelski and Rapkin provide details about three types of polarity in an
international system. A unipolar system is where one states controls fifty percent or more
of the relative capabilities that matter.
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‘Capabilities that matter’ is something that could

be problematic to define but for the purposes of this paper and logic these would be
economic and military capabilities. It is likely Modelski and Rapkin et al. could include
other variables. For example the population and size of the country could be very
significant in determining how important an actor can be in determining the efficacy of
sanctions. These are important but would be considered as secondary compared to the
economic and military might of any country that has an effect on sanctions. For sanctions
to be effective or implemented the nation, nations or organizations advocating for them
would have to have economic means and the military strength to ensure they are effective.
A bipolar system is one where two states control at least fifty percent of the
relative capabilities and each of the two actors possess at least twenty-five percent with
no other state controlling as much as twenty-five percent. 32 This situation can be
confusing as they are likely to be a variety of combinations especially when two control
twenty-five percent of resources while the others control close to twenty-five percent. For
the purposes of this paper and in relation to sanctions this twenty-five percent will again

30 Thompson, "Polarity, the Long Cycle, and Global Power Warfare."
31 ibid
32 ibid
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be relative to military and economic might of the two countries involved with the rest
having no such capabilities. The authors also point out that the issue of nuclear weapons
would have to be from the perspective of how much money and resources a country in
33
the system spends on maintaining their nuclear stock pile33.
That is, it is not the number

of nuclear weapons (from a military perspective) that a country has, but rather how much
they spend to maintain them in comparison to other countries in the system.
A multipolar system is where three or more states each control at least five
percent of the relative capabilities but no single state controls as much as fifty percent
and no two states have as much as twenty-five percent apiece. This simple guide of the
different polarities allows me to show how the effectiveness of sanctions can swing from
being strong to relatively weak based on the changes in economic and military
capabilities. The analysis of South Africa, Iran and China will point to how the sanctions
are more effective are in a unipolar system and how they become weaker in a system that
is moving towards multipolarity. This is true because countries have different political
setups and have different interests. These differences are more likely to cause a form of
chaos in the world and the best example would be World War I and II that all happened
during time periods that were multipolar.34 In these cases you had the United States,
Britain and Germany as the competing powers.
The realist view of world polarity includes Long Cycle Theory and Power Cycle
Theory. Long cycle theory is based on two major premises. The first being that global

33 Thompson, "Polarity, the Long Cycle, and Global Power Warfare."
34 ibid
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wars give birth to a new leadership and this state is always a maritime trading state35 .
This is true even today as any country other than the United States identified as a
potential world leader has access to the oceans and seas of the world. The best examples
would be members of the G8 (group of eight most developed countries; US, Britain,
Japan, Germany, France, Italy, Russia and Canada) as well as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia,
India, China and South Africa). The identification of these countries allows for the next
premise to be established. The second premise of Long Cycle theory is that the state that
emerges victorious from the global war has to convincingly show that its military power
is able to support economic goals36; these economic goals monopolize the system both
economically and legally. To conduct a global war the countries involved will need a
strong military and one that can travel to a warzone anywhere on the globe. Military
campaigns anywhere around the globe, in any form; full scale war, preventive or
insurgency, requires that the country pursuing have the financial muscle to do so. The
country has to have a very strong economy to support such a campaign. This would be
possible because it can raise taxes, borrow capital and use other financial instruments
with the confidence that the country’s economy will be able to pay back all its
commitments without any strain on the economy itself. All the countries singled out as
potential hegemons have the navy to travel the globe and the economy to support its
military expeditions.
The kinds of wars the Long Cycle theory applies to are inter-state (between
sovereign nations). For example, World War I and II: from which emerged a clear victor,

35 Kohout, “"Cyclical, Hegemonic, and Pluralistic, Theories o f International Relations: Some Comparative
Reflections on War Causation."
36 Kohout, “"Cyclical, Hegemonic, and Pluralistic, Theories o f International Relations”

24

the allied forces, and a loser the German forces. After World War I Britain and the United
States emerged as great powers and after World War II the United States then Russia
emerged as super powers. While World War I and II were both full scale campaigns on
the European continent and almost every strategic location on the planet, that is not the
type of war that has continued since 1945. War has evolved and countries like the US and
The Soviet Union adapted to the new world supporting proxy wars financially or with a
limited number of their own military personnel.
However, after the experiences of such wars it is clear that they are unlikely to
happen. To influence outcomes, a hegemon or rising power is likely to lend assistance or
carry out a campaign in other foreign countries that are classified as threats. While ‘war’
does not involve direct conflict between the United States and some of the potential
countries; the war the super power is involved in affects its economic and military
capabilities. In the case of the United States this war has happened twice. America’s war
against terrorism has led to its involvement combined with the support of its allies in
Afghanistan. While the preemption of a nuclear attack or the use of Weapons of Mass
Destruction (WMDs) led to the conquering and occupation of Iraq. These two wars
within the same decade from 2001 to 2010 (whit the continued presence of US forces in
Afghanistan till 2014) has had a serious impact on the economy and military impact of
the United States.
By engaging in two wars at once, the United States portrayed the very definition
of a super power in a unipolar system. An extension of the long cycle theory is
hegemonic theory, which realists use to explain the actions of unipolar, bipolar and
multipolar super powers such as the United States. Hegemonic theory asserts that the
25

world will be dominated by a powerful state that will set the rules 37 . These rules will be
used in economic transactions and local and international disputes because the country
has the capability to use military force. The important consequence of this theory that is
crucial to the analysis of sanctions is the cost-benefit ratio associated with hegemony.
According to Gilpin, the hegemon has reason to keep the status quo and will absorb all
38

the cost necessary to maintain the system . The United States, for example, it was
important to go into Afghanistan to defeat terrorism and ensure that an attack such as
9/11 would never again take place on its soil. From the American stand point cost was
not an issue because terrorism was going to disrupt it economic, political and global
interests. Further, America invaded Iraq for two reasons; first, to bring democracy to the
region and depose Saddam Hussein. Secondly, to ensure that Saddam Hussein would not
use WMDs on his people, against America, or provide them to terrorists who had sworn
to endanger the lives of Americans.
The cost of running two wars on another continent has had direct impact on the
superpower’s economy. By trying to maintain the status quo that it inherited, the costs
associated with conducting two wars at once began to overcome the likely benefits. As
important, straining the economy has a direct impact on how effective sanctions can be
effectively imposed on target countries because the superpower will have to focus on
stabilizing its economy to maintain the status quo. To finance the wars it is conducting,
the United States had to borrow money domestically and internationally; this borrowing
changed the US from the world’s largest creditor to the largest debtor. This can give
leverage to countries that lend money to the United States; allowing them more freedom
37 Kohout, “"Cyclical, Hegemonic, and Pluralistic, Theories of International Relations”
38 ibid
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in pursuing their national interests even if they do not agree with the United States. This
in essence begins the shift from unipolarity to either bipolarity or multipolarity depending
on how many other countries in the system are benefiting from the United States inability
to maintain the status quo. This is the case with the BRICS and some European Countries
that are primary beneficiaries. For sanctions to be effective the country imposing them
needs a resilient economy. However, if the number of countries with strong economies
begins to increase (at the expense of the unipolar superpower) then the target country has
more flexibility to bypass sanctions without the threat of retaliation. Put simply, the
superpower cannot command the outcomes it desired compared to those expected before
the rise of the challenging nations without putting itself at further risk economically.
Long Cycle and, Hegemonic Theory; encompass factors which may explain a
shift in polarity. Power cycle theory provides another dimension related to those looking
to have more influences on the system: the use of economics as an instrument of foreign
policy designed to shift polarity. Power cycle theory states that in a unipolar system, the
superpower’s politics and economy become the underlying dynamic of international
politics. It focuses on the systemic (historic) role of each state and how this role is
perceived by the elites of other nations, and what impact the changing distribution of
power has on the role and security of the state 39 . Power Cycle theory reinforces the
importance of how a country perceives itself and how it adjusts to change, depending on
the ever-changing structure of the global system. Charles F. Doran, raises a key question;
“As a state’s relative power decreases, how should it adjust its state’s role and power?” 40

39 Kohout, Kohout, “"Cyclical, Hegemonic, and Pluralistic, Theories o f International Relations”
40 Doran, "Economics, Philosophy o f History, and the 'Single Dynamic' o f Power Cycle Theory:
Expectations, Competition, and Statecraft."
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The most likely scenario for a country in this position is that it will be less willing to
accept the reduction of its influence and likely continue with the same policies that it had
while it was still the hegemonic power. This theory has a direct impact on sanctions
because they can be followed and implemented only to the degree the hegemonic power
can enforce them. If the super power begins to lose its grip on controlling the world
system it promoted, then the sanctions are less likely to be effective overall.
The power cycle theory also allows us to look at the polarity from the perspective
of countries that are challenging the international policies of the hegemon. Rather than
focus on the United States, in a state of decline (as could be the case now) another way of
evaluating the shift in polarity would be by analyzing the economic rise of the other
countries41 that affect the effectiveness of sanctions. Up to the present, the United States
is critical to the financing and preservation of the international organizations that initiate
or maintain development around the world (e.g. The World Bank, International Monetary
fund and the Export-Import Bank). These development and economic improvement
agencies function because the United States provides a large percentage of operating and
financing capital. Based on the premise that each nation has to contribute a certain
amount, based on its GDP, the United States is the largest benefactor. This allows the US
to exert the goals of a capitalist democratic country on countries that apply for help. For
every country that applied for aid or development projects, especially after the end of the
Cold War, the conditions associated with that aid were principles that the United States
continues to champion to this day.

41 Chandra, "The Rise and Rise o f Emerging Market Banks."
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However, these institutions are being challenged by the rise of other institutions
that Russia, Brazil and China, for example, are creating. The creation of International
Banks such as The Brazilian National Development Bank and the China Development
42
Bank are important examples; they provide loans that are virtually interest free42
and give

other countries the ability to avoid banks with American influences. This loosens the
United States influence on the world economy and makes its sanctions much weaker
because other countries and companies that would like to do business with a target
country have other avenues of doing transactions.
The maritime part of hegemonic and long cycle theory is another important aspect,
especially when combined with the power cycle theory. Once countries like China,
Russia, and Brazil begin to have actual economic capabilities to influence the world’s
outcomes - they are likely to strengthen their military. Of the countries that are likely to
affect the effectiveness of United States and International Organization (backed mainly
by the US) sanctions, all of them are located on oceans. Of the countries rising as polarity
contenders (e.g. China, India and Russia) all are currently expanding and strengthening
their military capabilities by adding aircraft carriers to their maritime fleets43. The
purchase and renovation of an aircraft carrier by the Chinese Government, for example, is
a clear indication that it wants to have complete control of its territorial waters. It is also a
clear indication by the communist government that it wants to be able to protect its
interests abroad44just as the United States has done over the years. With its increasing aid
and investment in Asia, Africa and South America, it is in the Chinese government’s best

42 THE ECONOMIST. "The Dragon's New Teeth." .
43 ibid
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interests to ensure that its assets are not vulnerable. Even though the Chinese official
foreign policy statement is not to use hard power to enforce their agenda45, its actions
often seem to suggest the opposite. Russia’s involvement in the Ukraine, without any
serious consequences or fear of threats from the United States is also a sign that the
international system is clearly moving towards a multipolar state. Even previous
hegemons are reluctant to take on additional costs to maintain their status; rather, they
pick and choose fights they know they can win and refuse to do so if they fear they
cannot.
This is likely to be the future. It is where the power cycle theory with its focus on
economic changes solidifies the case for a change in polarity. Economics of trade and
politics become more important in determining whether or not sanctions are imposed. As
the long cycle and hegemonic stability theories predict; the dominant power has used its
military strength to ensure that its interests in regions it considers important, are
maintained. This has often meant that country with a strong military will almost always
get to determine the outcomes they desire.
In this environment, imposing of sanctions will have to be smarter; to target not
the country but those who are in control. This is more likely to be achieved by having a
strong economy in which others are likely to invest or obtain the goods and services from.
While the US was engaged in two wars trying to maintain the status quo; a country like
China has been enjoying an unprecedented seven percent growth rate46 that allowed it to
lend money to the hegemon. This dependency has resulted in reducing the ability to

45 THE ECONOMIST. "The Dragon's New Teeth."
46 ibid
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influence China to join in efforts to contain Iran by economic sanctions. Similarly, Russia
is building strong economic ties in the Middle East and Eastern Europe; this makes its
political and economic actions more legitimate. For example, Russia’s political
calculation to be the main actor to advocate for the destruction of its Chemical weapons
47

stock pile is something that shows its growing economic and political capabilities .
So while China, Brazil, Russia or India and the United States didn’t engage in war,
it was war in Iraq and Afghanistan that create the final necessary conditions for a major
shift in polarity. This shift will have an increasingly large impact on the potential
effectiveness of sanctions proposed by the US. Other countries have grown economic
capabilities which will give them increasingly direct impacts on the outcomes of such
effects.
Long Cycle, Hegemonic and especially the Power Cycle theory can be applied to
contemporary cases to access the effectiveness of sanctions. Each part of their combined
insights contributes to the understanding of how imposing sanctions depend on how they
react to systemic shifts in power, including when different countries are becoming major
players in the world’s political economy. In a unipolar world, it is possible for the
hegemonic power to shape the effectiveness of sanction by convincing its allies to do the
same; this is exactly what the United States has done and is still doing in some areas.
Such a condition is found in assessment of how the Iran Sanction Act has been applied by
the United States and how its allies in Europe and around the world are affected by it.
However, in a bipolar or multi polar world, the existing or past hegemon that imposes
sanctions has to be much more considerate of the other major players of the economy. To
47 Zakaria. "Circling the Wagons on Syria.".
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maintain trade that favorable to your country with China might be more important than
continuing a policy of sanctions attempting to achieve regime change. While regime
change might be important to the United States, it will not be necessarily true for other
main players in the world system. Hence the United States would have to reduce the
stringency of sanctions to accommodate the wishes of other countries so as to not face a
more hostile political economy. In the end, the nuances that come with a change in world
polarity have to be understood in analyzing the potential effectiveness of sanctions.
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SO U TH -A FR IC A
Apartheid South Africa is the country most academics will point to as a classic
example where sanctions were used and garnered intended, unintended and unexpected
consequences. However the biggest problem that people are likely to face when talking
about the sanctions that were imposed on South Africa since 1960 - just 15 years after
the end of the of World War II - is to confuse the nuclear sanctions with the apartheid
sanctions. These two sets of sanctions did intersect, but they had different objectives and
achieved different results. The apartheid sanctions can be considered successful, the
nuclear sanctions are usually considered to have failed. The inconsistent results of the
sanctions applied to the same country will help me further explain why the conditions
outlined in my framework if met, could lead to the results that the apartheid sanctions
achieved without the complications of either partial or total failure. South Africa provides
a very useful setting to elaborate the model as well as set the platform to fully
conceptualize the framework I hope to promote as a new way of looking at sanctions.
Based on the framework I am working with the intended consequences are the
premises for which sanctions are being applied by the imposing48countries to the target49
country/region. The objective of the sanctions is to ensure that the intended consequences
are achieved. The judgment of whether or not the sanctions were successful is what
determines whether or not the intended consequences are met. The unintended
consequences are the effects that most people will point to when condemning sanctions
48 This will be explained in further detail in the part o f the paper that has the framework. The sender
country is the nation that is imposing the sanctions.
49 The target country is the country receiving the sanctions.
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against a target country. As explained in the framework it is the unintended consequences
that bring about the effects of sanctions on the welfare and livelihood of the citizens of
the target country. The reactions from the citizens or institutions are what will usually
give you a sign as to whether the unintended consequences are detrimental to the
sanctions or not. Unintended consequences either can bring about a positive or negative
feedback. Then we will see what the unexpected consequences look like primarily in
terms of the sender country in relation to the target country. Unexpected consequences
are the effects that the sanctions being imposed have on the imposing country. These are
the consequences that raise more questions about the sender’s country’s main goals but
also importantly how the sanctions may affect it (which is almost always the case and is
treated as the standard for this paper).
In the early 1970’s South Africa announced its secret new uranium-enrichment
process that served as a reason not to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that was
adopted by the UN General Assembly on 12th June 1968. They feared that they would not
have enough control or reap the rewards of its commercial capabilities.50 As this was
during the Cold War, the two main powers were disturbed by this development and both
worried as to which one would get their hands on this technology first. South Africa
during this period had a nuclear arsenal that was primarily provided by the United States
and some of its European allies such as France and Britain. South Africa was imposed
with sanctions that would compromise its commercial power reactors the Keoberg I and
II (low-enriched uranium and supplied by France) and its Safari-I (high enriched uranium

50 Hufbauer, “Economic sanctions reconsidered.”
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and supplied by the US)51. With its new technology that could possibly weaponize the
uranium and with its refusal to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty which would have given
comfort to the major powers - the United States government under President Carter
decided to impose sanctions on South Africa to get them to sign the NPT.
If we were to funnel this information through the framework and include
particular details that were later discovered, we could begin to see why these sanctions
that were imposed for about seven years were considered relatively unsuccessful. The
intended consequence of the sanctions during the Carter administration was to obtain
South Africa’s signature to the NPT which would then require the target country to
adhere to the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
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Added to

this and with President Carter’s well known pursuit of the recognition of Human Rights;
another secondary reason was to put some form of pressure on the government to
reconsider the Apartheid policies (however, this was a side note). The main objective of
the sanctions was met and South Africa did eventually sign the NPT and follow its
procedures, but that was not until 1991.
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The problems with these sanctions begin to

emerge once you begin to look at the unintended consequences of the sanctions brought
about. The first unintended consequence of the US sanctions was that it exposed the
United States true position with respect to South Africa - that is, the United States
wanted to leverage the sanctions against them to have more influence over the country in
the context of the Cold War. In 1979 forty-nine nonaligned East-bloc and developing
countries outvoted the US and its 24 Western allies from barring South Africa from

51 ibid
52 Hufbauer, “Economic sanctions reconsidered.” Database.
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participating in the 1979 IAEA summit.54 To make matters worse the Reagan
administration took a very strong position in the Cold War conflict against Russia and
approved for the export of powerful computers to South-Africa that could be used to
design nuclear weapons55- all this to shift the balance of power in southern Africa
towards America.
While the US might have initiated the sanctions against South Africa, it becomes
clear once you analyze the fallout with other nations that it did so with its own interests in
mind. The US itself became the country that allowed South Africa to develop its nuclear
arsenal even though they became cautious once they realized that South Africa might
have had developed the capability to proliferate. The UK and US saw South Africa as a
source of uranium for their own nuclear programs and in the context of the Cold War
they had to get their hands on it before the USSR built more nuclear weapons than they
had. As David Fig points out in his analysis of the nuclear sanctions against South Africa
that despite the country’s nuclear establishment insistence that the technology was home
grown; it was virtually impossible for the country to be as advanced as the US, UK and
USSR without outside help.56 He goes on to claim that it is more likely that the US and
UK were behind the funding of the nuclear program and their interest in uranium deposits
in South Africa. The UK and US funding to South Africa, allowed the apartheid
government to easily navigate around the sanctions imposed by other countries. The
Reagan and Thatcher administrations (which play a very crucial role in the South Africa
episodes) were administrations that put free market economics over international politics.

54 ibid
55 Hufbauer, “Economic sanctions reconsidered. “Database.
56 Crawford, Klotz; “How Sanctions Work: Lessons from South Africa.”
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Hence it is not surprising that since they didn’t account for the unexpected consequences
(their need for uranium) they could not simply follow suit with the rest of the UN.
The failure of these countries to foresee the unexpected consequences of the
sanctions they initiated in good faith and eventually for leverage put the sanctions on a
road to failure (partial effectiveness). It is also reported that during the Carter presidency,
sanctions imposed on South Africa cost the US nuclear industry lost sales of about $134
million by not being able to sell fuel cells to the South African reactors. 57 This economic
impact was something that capitalist governments of Reagan and Thatcher could not
accept. They reconsidered the terms of trade with South Africa through the policy of
“Constructive Engagement”. This policy was designed to relax most sanctions on South
Africa while the President used back channels to change or end the apartheid system.
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Basically the sanctions imposed on South Africa were unlikely to have any real effect
until the apartheid sanctions began to kick in (as will be explained) and this was due to
the fact that the desired effect of the sanctions was soon seen as a disadvantage to the
country that initiated them. These disadvantages that the US identified then became the
unintended consequences of applying sanctions in the first place and combined with the
economic pressures which were unexpected - the sanctions were destined to be
ineffective until the apartheid sanctions began pulling their weight.
Apartheid in South Africa was a policy that was designed to separate the white
minority from the other races - the black majority in particular. In 1948 after the
Nationalist Party had assumed power, they decided to make this separation law. Between

57 Hufbauer, “Economic sanctions reconsidered.” Database.
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1948 and 1950 the government had passed the Prohibition of Mixed Marriage Act, Group
Areas Act (separate residential areas) and the Population Registration Act (required
official registration of race).59 The first sets of sanctions imposed were in 1960 when the
UN passed resolution S/4300 that deplored the violence and called for an end to
apartheid.60 The UN, its new members and the newly decolonized African states which
eventually form the new African Union are the main senders of these sanctions. The
intended consequences of these sanctions were to end the apartheid that was leading to
political unrest and hopefully overtime and with the right political climate ensure the
black majority assent to power. The other aim was to terminate South African presence in
Namibia and ensure it regained its sovereignty.61 The Namibian objective was achieved
relatively early, in 1970, when a UN resolution ended the South African trusteeship of
Namibia and Zambia temporary held the reins until a new government was elected to
office.
This intended consequence was achieved due to the fact that all member countries
that exported arms to South Africa banned all shipments. This was partly due to the fact
that most European colonial powers were withdrawing from Africa and handing them
independence. By 1970 more than half the countries in Africa had gained independence
and ‘colonial guilt’ had already begun to set in. ‘Colonial guilt’, here meaning that former
colonialists were not willing to agitate the other countries soon after leaving them after
having treated them as second class human beings. So as to reduce the tensions that
existed between themselves and their former colonies - the least they could do was

59 Hufbauer, “Economic sanctions reconsidered. “Database.
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militarily isolate the Apartheid regime. This ban of arms by all trading members seemed
to make the South African military high command have a change of heart, as they
realized that their army might not be able to control the state of Namibia if the other
African countries with the help of outside assistance decided to help Namibia. Apartheid
on the other hand was an issue that was not going to slowly go away with the
implementation of an arms embargo. South Africa’s geological position allows for all its
citizens to move freely between borders and assimilate or take refuge in neighboring
countries that had already obtained colonial freedom - this movement creates a host of
unintended consequences. During this period the majority of Southern African countries
shared the same traditions, religion and more importantly the same political ambitions.
The white minority government could not use the sanctions imposed on them to gain
internal momentum (or a rally-around- the-flag effect) to further their cause against the
countries that imposed the sanctions (as Iran did). The only way they could suppress
internal rebellion was by creating a strong police state. Once this happened the vocal
political activists would leave the country but were welcomed with open arms in the
neighboring countries. This unintended consequence worked so well for the oppressed
freedom fighters to the point that the South African government of President Botha had to
send agents to kill political dissidents in neighboring countries.62 In this case the
unintended consequence was positive for the freedom fighters but negative for the
apartheid government. Negative, in that, it did not act in favor of the government but
rather worked against them.

62 Hufbauer, “Economic sanctions reconsidered. “Database.
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Such events led to more bans, especially from crucial trading partners such as the
Organization of Arab Petroleum-Exporting Countries (OAPEC) except Iran, which
greatly put pressures on the apartheid government. However, the government countered
this by first no longer publishing its oil imports and also building strategic reserves in the
Transvaal Mountains that could have sustained the country for up to 5 years.63 What this
meant was that the South African government had temporarily negated the effect of the
oil embargo. Being a country that was resistant to change was never going to be easy
between the 1960’s and 1990’s because the Civil Rights movement was just gaining
momentum in the US. This movement was one of the unexpected consequences that both
the imposing and target countries did not see or prepare for. With pressure mounting in
Western countries to implement laws that brought about integration, South Africa’s
Apartheid Government became more isolated in its stance against racial mixing. With
activists like Martin Luther King Jr. continuously singling out South Africa as a country
that people should be less associated with it became increasingly clear they had to revise
some of their policies.
This unexpected consequence that the apartheid government of South Africa as
well as the United States didn’t expect, had huge implications on the fight against
segregation was the disinvestment of multinational corporations. In March of 1977 eleven
multinational companies developed codes of conduct that were to affect the structure of
the workplace64. Unlike, many state-owned companies in South Africa at the time anyone
race could be hired and promoted. There were no limitations on how far you could
progress in a multinational company. These were developed by Rev. Leon Sullivan who
63 How Sanctions Work
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was the first black board member of General Motors. This was definitely much easy to
adopt because Carter was President and he most likely supported any efforts that would
promote human rights and end segregation in South Africa. By July 1978, it was reported
by Rev. Sullivan that an expanded version of his codes of conduct would be adopted by
103 other companies.65 This was a clear indication that the multinational companies were
willing to reflect what was happening in their countries and didn’t want to be associated
with segregation. These codes of conduct came under threat when Ronald Reagan came
to power (1981) and announced the policy of ‘constructive engagement’ which would
relax diplomatic, economic, technology and nonlethal exports for the South African
military and police sanctions.66 This was clearly due to the fact that Reagan was going to
take a hard line approach to the Cold War and had to ensure that a country such as South
Africa was going to be on the side of America rather than Russia.
By relaxing the sanctions on exports and some imports, the Apartheid regime no
longer felt the pressure that the multinational companies were applying. In 1984
multinational companies stepped up their game and 119 United States companies agreed
to expand the Sullivan principles.67 As a President who believed in liberal economics
Reagan began to take notice of the actions of these American companies. Most of these
companies began to disinvest in their South African holdings which meant that South
Africa was starved of capital and technology.68 The impacts of this disinvestment were
double digit inflation, currency devaluation and a climate of heightened uncertainty due
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to isolation.69 Some of these companies were basically taking a risk because the
government had an option of kicking them out or buying the company at a cheap price if
they decided to leave. Since South Africa was a country that wanted to have a strong
economy that would compete with the world and would be the strongest in Africa, the
apartheid regime could not ignore these pressures. To make matters worse in 1985 the
blacks who accounted for over half of all retail sales boycotted white-owned business
which forced the business owners to go to Pretoria (seat of government) and advocate for
the improvement of the majority’s welfare.
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From 1985 to 1994 the primary tool that

anti-apartheid movements and individuals used as leverage becomes the role of the
multinational companies.
Another unexpected consequence that arises from the imposing of sanctions
comes from the structure of the United States government. The White House and the
Congress can both impose sanctions on a particular country. However, this doesn’t mean
that the sanctions the two branches of government impose will be the same or will have
the same support especially if there is a different majority in the senate and house. The
President might execute executive orders, but that doesn’t necessarily mean the bill in
congress will address the same concerns - this is the difficulty that Reagan faced with
regards to South Africa and something Obama will face in regards to Iran (later in the
paper). Initially Reagan had relaxed sanctions against South Africa, but congress was
about to pass a bill that would do the exact opposite. In 1986 the senate overrode
Reagan’s veto of the sanctions bill by passing the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act
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which banned all loans, banned new investment (disinvestment) and set five goals for the
lifting of sanctions; these were:
1. Release of all political prisoners, those who were detained without trial
and the release of Nelson Mandela
2. Repeals of the state of emergency... and release all detainees held under
such state of emergency
3. Remove ban on all political parties, movements and let everyone
regardless of race participate in the democratic process
4. Repeal of the Group Areas Act and the Population Registration Act
5. Agree to enter into good faith negotiations with the main representative
black majority without preconditions. 71
With each passing year the congress tightened sanctions especially on investment
and Reagan could not do anything to stop him as he was afraid of being embarrassed by
being unable to veto if the senate and house were against him. In 1988 the House
approved sanctions legislation that ended all trade with South Africa except for strategic
mineral and even threatened to use force against countries that would try to help South
Africa on the black market. The legislation however, did not go through a vote in the
senate. 72 The complex nature of the American government structure, one could point out,
showed that the representatives of the American people were reflecting the change they
had seen in their constituencies. By the 1980’s the United States had gone through more
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integration compared to the 1960’s. By 1985, the US economy was doing well and the
US had become the undisputed hegemony. The threat of the going back to the Cold War
had lessened and after the fall of the Soviet Union the policy of “constructive engagement”
was no longer viable. At this point the apartheid government had no Cold War leverage
they could use to maintain their system of government. With sanctions tightening and the
world around them rapidly detesting segregation - it can be said that the unintended
consequences of sanctions largely helped end apartheid.
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IRAN
The Iran episode of sanctions could be seen through a number of different lenses
but it would be insightful to see it through their own. This narration could either be
politically correct or an oversimplification. In any case, it is necessary to understand how
the theocratic elite of Iran probably see the United States and the United Nations. During
the Iran - Iraq war of 1980 to 1988, Iran didn’t like the fact that the United States
actively supported the Iraqis by providing them with weapons (especially chemical
weapons) as well as destabilize a government that wasn’t inclined to follow western
conceptions of democracy and had just exiled the Shah (who was a western ideological
advocate). W hat surprised the Iranians more however was how quickly the US was ready
to dispose of Saddam Hussein on the premise that he had Weapons of Mass Destruction
and Chemical Weapons (that the US had provided). From this perspective - it only makes
sense for Iran’s elite leaders to come up with a policy that guarantees that they are not in
a position that Iraq found itself. To make matters worse the United States’ unconditional
support of Israel and the fact that it has nuclear weapons is unacceptable to Iran,
especially when they have historically been the regional power (as Persians). Therefore, it
should not come as a surprise that the country might want to have a deterrent in the form
of nuclear weapons; to both neutralize Israel’s nuclear capability and increase a certain
level of influence within the region.
The current sanctions now imposed on Iran by the United States and its allies in
Europe are a policy that would have been almost inconceivable had the Shah not been
exiled and the theocratic regime not taken a hard stance on US foreign policy. The
sanctions imposed on Iran begin in earnest during the Iranian hostage Crisis o f 1979,
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when US embassy employees were held by students who were supporters of the new
leader Ayatollah Khomeini who had just overthrown the US puppet leader - the Shah.
Sanctions were used by the Carter administration in a two-track or dualistic approach
73

immediately after learning about the embassy siege73. The administration was to apply
economic pressure on Iran through the prohibition of Iranian oil imports to the US, a
freeze of all Iranian state assets held by US institutions and a comprehensive
74

travel/embargo ban on all forms of trade with Iran . This was to achieve the dual goals
of bringing the Iranians to the table as well as to increase the cost of holding the US
hostages.
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This was the starting point of imposing sanctions against a country that has

had the majority of its political history governed by external powers and something the
Ayatollah was ready to change. We see this through the negative attitude he had towards
the United States and its allies.
The sanctions imposed on Iran show clearly how the world polarity played out at
that time and how international law was the basis on which these were imposed. The
sanctions were implemented as a tool to punish Iran for breaking international
law/protocol, but due to the power of the Soviet Union at the time, the United States
could only impose sanctions that had a limited effect. Another important assumption is
that Iran had a commodity that was important to the world and was one of major
producers o f it - oil. Initially when the United States tried to impose sanctions it had
difficulty achieving broad multilateral support for stiff penalties against Iran despite its
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allies’ sympathies over the affront of international law and diplomatic protocol76. Most of
the other countries feared that any strong sanctions would jeopardize relations and also
77

bring about anger towards other Islamic countries in the Muslim world . Since the
Ayatollah had just gained power, the Muslim world was not only in unison with his goals
but any form of aggression towards him would have been seen as an open disagreement
with the Islamic principles he advocated for - especially in the Shiite countries. To make
matters worse the Soviet Union saw this as an opportunity to engage with Iran more
effectively and also undermine the influence of US policy within the region. They did
this by vetoing a modest array of UN sanctions and went further by offering economic
assistance to Iran 78 . This relationship has been a key factor for Iran each time they seem
to be under pressure from the international community. Immediately after the
implementation of these sanctions and with Iran’s influence in the OPEC we shortly see
the rise of oil prices in what becomes known as the ‘Oil Crisis o f 1979.’
During the late 70’s and early 80’s the United States and the Soviet Union were
clearly the two countries that determined most of the world’s political and economic
activities. At this point, the United States had not solidified its power with its allies in the
west to the point where its word was going to be policy that the other countries would try
to follow as closely as possible to be in line with their own. This begins to change during
the Reagan years and even more so during the Clinton years when the United States
becomes the undisputed strongest nation, hence creating a unipolar system. After the fall
of the Soviet Union in 1990; we begin to see the creation of stronger US regulations in
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the area of trade with what were considered hostile nations. Using the institutions the US
and its allies created after World W ar II such as the World Bank (WB), International
Monetary Finance (IMF) and the various branches of the United Nations (UN) it begins
to squeeze Iran’s economic pipeline so as to influence its political behavior. When the
Soviet Union had sufficient power and resources most countries had the option of
ignoring these institutions and simply borrowing money or selling their commodities to
them without having to worry about the institutions in which the US had great and
unrivalled influence. This changed completely.

During the 1990’s after the Iran-Iraq war, Iran had to borrow money from the
World Bank to rebuild its war-torn economy
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- this was the time for the United States to

strike. The US pressured it allies to prevent Iran from having access to other financial
institutions such as the Paris Club and not let it reschedule its debt due to the financial
80

crisis it had in 1993 . US representatives in the World Bank and other institutions would
oppose any loans it might ask for any further development. This development was
important to Iran because it had to upgrade and build new oil fields that would go on to
sustain its economy. Iran, however, had serious difficulties in obtaining investors who
would invest in their economy. During 1995 and 1996 the US government made the
sanctions against Iran even more severe by creating legislature known as the ‘Iran
81
Sanctions Act of 1996’ . This impacted financial, technological, service and trade
transactions going out o f and into Iran. This piece of legislature also classified Iran as a
nation that wanted to manufacture weapons of mass distraction and a nation that
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supported terrorist activities . This legislation is accompanied by a statute known as
OFAC - Office of Foreign Assets Control which is under the Department of Treasury and
monitors any transactions that might be linked to Iran or any other countries that are
under UN and US sanctions.
On March 16, 1995, as a result of Iranian support of international terrorism and
Iran’s active pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, President Clinton issued an
Executive Order prohibiting U.S. involvement with petroleum development in Iran. On
May 6, 1995, he signed another Executive Order pursuant to the International Emergency
83

Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”) substantially tightening sanctions against Iran . The
IEEP Act is different from the Iranian Sanctions Act and OFAC regulations because it is
a law that gives the President the power to determine which country (any country) poses
a threat to US interests. Unlike the OFAC regulations which can apply to anyone or the
Iranian Sanction Act which is specific and bilateral the IEEP Act is subjective and valid
as long as the President can prove his case to congress. The language in the legislature
states that the President can exercise his powers to deal with any unusual and
extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United
84

States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States . This
language gives the US President lots of power against countries that he would deem
dangerous but also gives him the power to coerce his allies to aligning with US foreign
policy. This was met with little resistance from allies and other countries that would have
been affected by this legislation. This was another sign that the United States was seen as
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the only power that could solely influence world politics and economics without having
to contend with any backlash or pushback from any other viable power (such as the
Soviet Union). These statutory instruments also guaranteed that US companies would not
be allowed to bid for any of the oil field projects in Iran. Even if US companies could bid
for the oil field projects the US was not going to approve of any loans or monetary aid in
international lending institutions that it had major influence. This led to the withdrawal of
US companies in the bidding process for oil fields reduced the competitive environment
85

that the Iranian government would have hoped for .
The extent of these sanctions was not only limited to US companies in the US but
also to those that were located outside the US and used US technology, US financial
services/instruments or US equipment to function around the world. On August 19, 1997,
the President signed another Executive Order, clarifying the Executive Orders involving
petroleum development in Iran and the IEEPA; confirming that virtually all trade and
investment activities with Iran by U.S. persons, wherever located, are prohibited.86 This
means that ‘No U.S. person may approve or facilitate the entry into or performance of
transactions or contracts with Iran by a foreign subsidiary of a U.S. firm that the U.S.
person is precluded from performing directly. Similarly, no U.S. person may facilitate
87

such transactions by unaffiliated foreign persons. ’ And for companies in the petroleum
business this was a confirmation that ‘U.S. persons may not trade in Iranian oil or
petroleum products refined in Iran, nor may they finance such trading. Similarly, U.S.
persons may not perform services, including financing services, or supply goods or
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technology that would benefit the Iranian oil industry.’

These measures are enforced

primarily by the US navy which virtually polices the entire world with aircraft carriers in
the Persian Gulf. Then, secondarily by the US State, Justice, Treasury and Commerce
departments depending on which regulations have been violated - depending on which
part of the Iran Sanctions Act is covered by a particular department. With the firepower
that is to this day unrivaled, an economy that was recording a surplus during the 1990’s
to early 2000 and the resources to effectively litigate companies that would try to evade
these sanctions, the US government was determined to achieve the goals it intended by
imposing the sanctions.
The dominance of the United States itself and its influence after the fall of the
Soviet Union can be seen, at least partially, in the way it applied sanctions and how it
almost single-handedly brought about serious long and short term economic implications
to Iran. These implications can be flashed out much more explicitly when funneled
through the framework of intended, unintended and unexpected consequences. Since
1979 to this day there have been a number of reasons the US has imposed sanctions on
Iran. The first wave of sanctions against Iran in 1979 as stated were to apply economic
sanctions so as to release the American Hostages the country was holding after the
revolution. It w asn’t until 444 days passed that the hostages were released and sanctions
were relaxed to a certain extent. The length they were able to hold on to US hostages
without any military reaction speaks volumes about the system polarity of the time. This
first wave of sanctions had two main stated objectives (the dual policy): ‘the safe return
of the US hostages/prisoners and the protection of the property claims of US individuals
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and Corporations against Iran’ . The intended consequences of the sanctions were
achieved, but it is important to point out that these are different from most sanctions the
US or the UN are likely to impose on a target country today. Unlike the second wave of
sanctions imposed or those imposed on other countries the intended objectives were not
designed to change the internal behavior, structure and political practices of the target
country. At no point did the US request that Iran change its methods of governing or
cease its influence promoting anti-American activities in the Middle and some areas of
the Far East. This is an exception to the definitions adopted for this paper but these
sanctions highlight how sanctions have evolved over time in regards to punishing
countries that break international norms. In the end, the objectives were achieved, but
only after much consultation with its allies and the increasing influence of the multi
national corporations.
An Economist article and many sanction experts observed that the sanctions
placed on Iran ended up being effective because o f the Europeans solidarity with the US
to enforce the sanctions rather than the freeing o f the US hostages captured90. As far as
most western countries were concerned they did not want to be involved in Iranian
domestic politics. The expert went on to point out that America’s tactic of freezing most
of Iran’s assets abroad over the course of the 444 days combined with the limiting of
trade by its allies91 was enough to achieve the intended consequences without having to
bring about unintended or unexpected consequences. However, it is important to point
out that this episode of sanctions showed clearly the dynamics of the international system.
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With the Soviet Union clearly against the sanctions and the reluctance o f its allies to
support the sanctions explicitly - the US had to bide its time regarding how it would
impose effective sanctions. Due to the unique nature of the intended consequences
(which did not require internal change) as well as Iran’s unrealistic demands for holding
US hostages for more than a year; the US allies would have seen Iran’s stance as costly
without any political or economic benefits. From the allies perspective it would cost them
more economically, due to oil price increases, if they intervened in Iran. The US had
managed to make doing business with Iran much more expensive by denying it allies
access to its technology and credit services if they planned to use it in Iran. At this time it
is important to note that the US was the largest lender of money especially to its allies
who were still rebuilding and strengthening their economies after the devastations of
World W ar II but also after they had to let go of their colonies around the world that
provided extra income. Losing colonies proved to be expensive both by trying to
maintain them and also by no longer having free access to the commodities that financed
their activities. At this point the tide was against Iran and it only made sense to release
the hostages and give back what was due to US oil companies that had invested in the
region prior to the revolution.

The second waves of sanctions were imposed in 1984 and are still in effect to this
day. The sanctions had been limited but are now complete and more stringent. The only
exceptions to these sanctions are donations of articles intended to relieve human suffering
(such as food, clothing, and medicine), gifts valued at $100 or less, licensed exports of
agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical devices, and trade in “information and
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informational materials” . The main difference between the intended consequences of
these sanctions and the first wave sanctions is that the US demanded to see policy
changes that would change the political structure and policy o f Iran with regards to
terrorism, nuclear enrichment and proliferation and human rights in the country. In
October 1983 a US Marine Base in Beirut, Lebanon was bombed. It was alleged and
subsequently proved in 1984 that Iran played a part in the bombing of a US Marine base
93

that killed more than 200 people . This was seen as an act of terror and the US was
going to retaliate by ensuring that it imposed sanctions that would bring about a change
in policy or regime in Iran - this was the first consequence the US wanted to accomplish.
The second consequence came as a result of the regime’s determination to obtain nuclear
weapons as a deterrent against Israel and to assert itself as a power of the Middle East
region. The third consequence came about due to the very nature of Iranian politics. As a
theocratic state with an authoritarian-democratic style of carrying out politics the US
decided to add the issue of human rights to the list of state-behavior it decided to achieve.
As observed during the Green Revolution, Iranian authorities will crush any form of
mobilization by people who disagree with the status quo.
The unintended consequences that arise from these sanctions have been rather
more disturbing and bring to light the supremacy of the US from the 1990’s to about
2003.They also show how it is possible for other countries to ascend to the top of the
system to create a multi polar one and affect the effectiveness of sanctions. One of the
backlashes that the US noticed from placing sanctions on Iran is that the Ayatollah
regime strengthened its grip of power in the country by portraying the US as an
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imperialist nation. Using the support of Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war, the protection of
the Shah and its refusal to lend money to the country for development purposes; the elite
of the regime created a base that has had a deep mistrust of the United States. This
mistrust has led to the re-emergence of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
who answer to the Ayatollah and not to the President; a dynamic that the US seems to
ignore when dealing with Iran. Trust issues in the context of the Middle East should
never be underestimated when it comes to analyzing issues that might bring about
unintended consequences94.

The Revolutionary Guard is an elite force that controls the armed forces of Iran.
They were officially created in 1979 (they had been in existence in one form or another
before), after the fall of the Shah, by the Supreme Leader Ayatollah by decree with a
mandate to guard the revolution and its achievements95. The revolution and its
achievements are a reflection of the new regime’s consistent position of denouncing
western ideals and maintaining the traditional and cultural traits of Iran. One thing we
know for a fact is that this wing of the Iranian Republic with the Supreme Leaders is
inherently anti-American. The sanctions against Iran could be considered a gift the
regime accepted so as to turn its citizens against the US and its ‘imperialistic’ actions.
The other vital consideration about the Revolutionary Guard is that their role and
intervention in politics and the economy is neither constitutionally mandated nor legally
prohibited96. This gives both internal and external policy makers a headache because you
never really know what the Ayatollah could mandate IRGC to do or what they are
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capable of doing on their own. It is these propositions that make the Revolutionary Guard
a vital actor to analyzing the unintended consequences that Iran encounters in Politics as
well as economics. One thing the IRGC does from time to time is constantly run a
parallel agenda that seems to undermine the Iranian President or any negotiations that the
US might want to engage with the civilian government. This will be elaborated on the
when looking at the unexpected consequences.

The Iranian Sanctions Act of 1996 and the IEEPA prohibit the sale and use of
American technology in Iran - this provides a serious headache to American companies
and allies located outside the US who would like to invest in Iranian projects. This is an
area the IRGC takes advantage of because the sanctions allow it to take on the role of
provider and fill the the gap that these possible companies from the US allies would
occupied to do business. I had an interview with a trade sanctions lawyer and this is the
example he used (paraphrased):
“Take the example of Japan which is currently investing and exploring for oil in the rich untapped oil fields
[of Iran]. If a Japanese company, which is a US ally (in the broad sense of the word), were to purchase
equipment from a US company with the intention to use that equipment for the exploration of oil - that
would be crime and within the jurisdiction of the US to persecute the company that sold equipment to the
Japanese company. This would be especially problematic if the US Company knew the purpose of
purchasing the equipment.”97

This scenario provides several opportunities for the IRGC while discouraging US allies to
support sanctions that impact its ventures for cheap alternative oil sources rather than
Saudi Arabia. The IRGC is one of, if not the biggest, benefactor of the sanctions against
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Iran. With no specific mandate the IRGC takes the place of potential foreign investors
and begins to amass wealth that allows it to be defiant in the face of any threats of more
sanctions that the US might throw its way. By becoming a very important economic actor
without access to the equipment or finances it needs it is left with one option - turn to the
black market. This is known as the Criminalizing Consequence o f Sanctions98 and this is
worse if it is done by an entity that is considered a legitimate actor in the target country.
Simply stated sanctions create an economic (and political) opportunity structure that
privileges those best positioned99; which means any attempt to negotiate with the
government leads to the unexpected consequence of always arriving at a deadlock.
Research on the effects of sanctions imposed on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, by
Andreas, confirmed that while sanctions don’t bring about the criminalization effect they
enhance it tremendously. Generally, criminalization is considered a regrettable but
tolerable side effect of sanctions100 but the difference between Yugoslavia and Iran is that
the IRGC is a legal entity that has no clear mandate as to the role it can play in the
economy or political sphere. As a well-recognized entity the IGRC would use it resources
exclusively to consolidated its influence and repress any form of concern that many
ordinary Iranians might want to address.
This involvement in the economy by the IRGC actually worsens conditions for
those who want to see political and economic change. The Green Revolution that
occurred immediately after the re-election of President Ahmadinejad was swiftly
repressed by the IRGC because they were trying to protect their interests. The current
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President publicly but carefully asked the IRGC to reduce its role in the economy so as to
not to compete with private companies and create a competitive business environment101.
These are all unintended consequences of sanctions that the IRGC has had evolve in
order to protect the tenants of the revolution of 1979 and defend the country against
western ideals. And this is where the unintended consequences of sanctions are seen
explicitly. Due to the sanctions’ ability to cripple Iran’s financial system the inflation rate
is currently above thirty percent
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with many sources claiming it could range from thirty

to as much as a hundred percent (think Zimbabwe but with oil). High inflation means
high prices and with high prices means less goods and a general decline in the standard of
living. With less access to goods it is in the interests of businesses to raise the price of
products rather than reduce them. With restrictions on technology, the production costs of
goods and services are still the same and have to become more expensive since the
demand for those goods and services is still high. The Iranian government has had to
increase subsidies over the last number of years and is currently running a 30% budget
deficit.
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Only recently after the election of a new moderate President has the

government halted these programs so as to control inflation as well as stop the funding of
populist initiatives of the previous Ahmadinejad government such as the cheap housing
schemes.104
According to the Financial Times the percentage of Iranian families living under
the poverty line increased from 22 per cent to more than 40 per cent105 - a clear
indication that the sanctions are affecting ordinary Iranians’ way of life. The only
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problem for these people is that even if they tried to revolt, as they recently tried, the
IRGC would make sure that they could not. One of the intended consequences the US
would want to see is the ordinary citizen apply pressure on their governments so as to
eventually concede to the demands of the sanctioning country. However, if a legalized
entity of that regime benefits from the very same sanctions that have been imposed and
their position is threatened then the only way to ensure they remain in that position is to
suppress any form o f protest. This then goes on to have another knock on effect - the
people who were protesting get frustrated not only at the regime but also with the actor
that imposed the sanctions that put them in the situation they are currently in. They are
caught between a rock and a hard place. This position then forces them to re-evaluate
most of their options and are less likely to do one of the intended consequences that the
sanctioning country hopes to see. At this point the sender country is losing on two fronts:
1) on the propaganda front - since the government is using these ‘clashes’ to inform the
rest of the country how Western imperialistic motives are trying to destroy the country
and 2) discouraging the very action they are trying to promote within the masses.
The unexpected consequences that arise from the Iranian experience show more
clearly how the effectiveness of sanctions is shaped by the system polarity of the time.
The IRGC have become such a crucial actor in Iranian politics that almost all
negotiations over the nuclear program in the country have come down to them and the
Supreme Leader. However, they are not the only problem as this is almost the same
situation that the American government finds itself in. The US problem stems from the
fact that the Iranian Sanctions Act of 1996 has a number of goals that Iran has to reach
for the sanctions to be dropped - this is problem one. For the sanctions to be lifted, Iran

59

has to have ceased its efforts to design, develop, manufacture, or acquire a nuclear
explosive device or related materials and technology, chemical and biological weapons,
and ballistic missiles and ballistic missile launch technology106. These would be easy to
determine and the President can easily prove this to the committee and eventually
congress. The problem arises in the last condition that Iran has to meet, which is, that it
poses no significant threat to United States national security, interests, or allies
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. Read

allies as Israel (and refer to story about Israel). The problem with the last condition is that
it is subjective and something the President cannot easily prove to congress. It would be
almost impossible for any President especially a Democratic one to convince congress to
pass a bill that would lift sanctions against Iran considering the political deadlock the US
is currently experiencing and will likely continue experiencing. The problem even before
these countries negotiate is that regardless of what both Presidents say - there is no
guarantee it will happen. Due to the fact that the Revolutionary Guard is hawkish on all
foreign-policy issues and also profit from the sanctions
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it is impossible for the Iranians

to see any light at the end of the tunnel. Giving up their goal of getting nuclear weapons
while a country like Israel has them is not a proposition you could sell to the Supreme
Leader and the IRGC.
The other unexpected consequence comes from a shift in the world hegemonic
system of power. As elaborated earlier, the US has been the top dog since the fall of the
Soviet Union and I would personally say till the beginning of the great recession in 2007.
However, it is in between 2001 and 2003 that we begin to see Russia and China flex their
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economic muscles due to oil and exports respectively. The Russian government has done
this by making its exports and businesses an integral part of the Iranian economy. For
example, the largest exporter of arms to Iran since 1979 has been the Russian
Government109 - and as one of the biggest manufacturer of arms, the Russian government
has a reserved interest to what happens to Iran. This reserved interest in Iran is to have
some influence on the political discourse of other Sunni controlled countries such as
Syria, Egypt and Iraq. [One of the reasons Russia’s proposal to Syria to destroy its
chemical stockpiles was because of its influence in the region and support from Iran - a
strong supporter of Assad]. Russia also has the government owned Oil Company
Gazprom operating in the country with huge investments in its drilling and transporting
activities. Russia and Iran co-own the pipelines in the region that transport oil to Europe
and the rest of Asia. The sanctions against Iran are largely ineffective due to the rise of
Russia as an oil giant hence having the ability to trade with Iran on favorable terms.
Additional sanctions on Iran imposed in UN are almost always vetoed by Russia and
China especially if there interests in the country would be affected. This allows Iran to
trade on the oil exchange/swap market through Russia and China without the fear of any
retaliation from the US or its Western allies (that rely on Russian energy to avoid
shortfalls). This would have not been the case if the US was still the only growing
economic giant that determined the rate of China’s and Russia’s growth. A resurgent
Russia also means that it is military potential and capabilities provide a headache for a
country like the US that is likely to avoid a confrontation (even though they would win).

109 ibid

61

A major characteristic that established the United States a leading nation from
1945 to present; was its status as the world’s main creditor. This however, is no longer
the case as that title of the goes to China. This has caused cracks to appear in the
effectiveness and imposing of sanctions. According to RAND and New York University
(NYU), China’s aid to the world has increased almost sixteen fold.110 China pledged $52
billion dollars to the Middle East compared to the $162 million dollars in 2010111. O f this
Iran has received 88 percent of all aid sent to the Middle east which over the years has
accumulated to over $88 billion dollars with China receiving most deals of exploring and
developing the oil fields in the country
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. This flow of aid to Iran is China’s way of

trying to secure its energy future. With its booming economy and new position as the
second largest economy China has to ensure that its demands are met regardless of
sanctions imposed on Iran. Just like Russia, China is also investing in the building of land
transportation capabilities for energy harvested. The oil transportation system being built
guarantees Iran a source of income to keep its economy healthy as well as keeping the
elite of the theocratic state happy. As long as the elite as well as strong groups such as the
IRGC are happy, the sanctions on Iran are more likely to be in vain. This has severely
weakened sanctions the US has applied to Iran.
The other unexpected consequence that brings uncertainty towards the sanctions
regionally is the issue o f refugees running away from a conflict that the United States is
involved in Afghanistan. The war against terrorism that led the United States to invade
Afghanistan to defeat the Taliban has been on-going since the end of 2001. This war has

110 Wolf, et al "China's Foreign Aid and Government-Sponsored Investment Activities Scale, Content,
Destinations, and Implications."
111 ibid
112 ibid

62

created regional instability and a sense of confusion both for the international community
and the refugees themselves. Iran’s geographic location in the Middle East is
economically, politically and historically very strategic and crucial to determining the
mood of the region. It borders Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan - which are all proving to
be rather key in determining whether or not American Foreign Policy is successful or not.
The invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan in particular put Iran in the very unusual position of
having to receive refuges from two wars that were created by the very same country that
is imposing sanctions on it. This might seem minuscule in the context of sanctions being
imposed but this has a serious consequence when the refugees can’t find the ‘refuge’ they
need in Iran due to the sanctions imposed by the United States
According to a United Nations Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) report in
2012, their main populations of concern in the Islamic Republic of Iran were: Afghan
refugees who fled as a result of the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan from 1980
1992; and Iraqi refugees who have fled conflict in their country over the past decade
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The report might suggest that most of the refugees are from the Soviet era Afghan war,
but this doesn’t seem to make complete sense because the Iraqi refugees seem to have
been as a result of the US- Iraq war during the last decade. The number of Iraqi refugees
is currently at 44,100114 while that of Afghanistan is currently at 824, 100115 though it is
impossible to determine how many o f the Afghan refugees are as a result o f the USTaliban war. The likelihood and I might be wrong is that there are more from
Afghanistan than from Iraq during the same period. More worrying about the situation, is
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that Iran is expected by people in the region to provide some sort of relief due to its
history as a country of opportunity. Before the sanctions were implemented Iran was
where many people from Afghanistan immigrated to find jobs in the oil fields and send
money to their relatives back home. Currently, they are received with contempt by a local
population that is finding their standard of living deteriorating but also can’t find any
feasible means of income because the economy is constantly contracting. The UNHRC
goes on to report that one of the constraints they face are the socio-economic situation of
refugees in the Islamic Republic of Iran are being affected by the economic changes in
the country, inflation and international sanctions. Furthermore; banks were unable to
provide UNHCR with hard currency to pay refugee repatriation grants. Hyper-inflation
increased the cost of operations, with the result that UNHCR was able to provide
assistance to a smaller number of refugees than originally planned. The rising cost of
health services was one of the reasons the Government decided to stop providing direct
assistance to refugees suffering from a number of serious medical conditions116. With the
previous Ahmadinejad government focusing its resources on pro-government policies it
becomes virtually impossible to see how it would spend any money to help refugees from
another country.
The intended consequence of expecting the people in the region to apply pressure
on their government to change its policies so as to get rid of the sanctions - is no longer
seen as a viable option. This is made worse when you consider the fact that the Iranian
government might use the refugee problem to increase their influence in the region. This
is especially important because the central government in Tehran has not changed its
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policy toward Afghans, which is to provide asylum to refugees and a legal framework for
Afghan migrant labor.
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This means that the Iran government is willing to take on this

task of looking after refugees. W hether this would be a genuine or simply moral action is
something we cannot be certain about. However, according to a Financial Times article it
is then important to note that there are about 3m Afghans are living and working in
Iran. .. which is not a problem but is concerned that there are no jobs for Iranian youth.

118

This is clearly a problem as it is almost impossible to tell what the real unemployment
rate in Iran is with sources such as Aljazeera claiming it might be 13% or double the
figure. If this is the case there is unlikely to be any place for the refugees to find jobs to
help sustain them.

There can only be two possible explanations for why Iran is willing to take on
three million refugees while risking its economy and the wrath o f its own citizens, but
when analyzed from a broader context this can play out in the country’s favor. As
mentioned before the first goal would be to ensure they have some influence in the region
by showing some form of compassion to people in the region that they can use to spread
their anti-west messages. The other goal could be to use the aid that comes in for the
refugees to weaken the effectiveness of the sanctions on the economy by smuggling in or
out sanctioned goods. It is likely that the Iranian government could import and export
commodities under the umbrella of aid so that imposing countries do not detect illegal
trade. This is plausible due to the fact that the IRGC could use its black market operations
through aid channels. This would also be impossible for the countries imposing sanctions
to stop because they have an obligation through the UN to help refugees. This creates
117 Khalaj,”Sanctions on Iran Hit Afghan Refugees.”
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even more unexpected problems for the sanctioning countries because setting up effective
sanctions becomes much more complex and could lead to more unintended consequences.
Ultimately, the expected and unanticipated effects of sanctions leads to people in
the region to ask serious questions about what role the US is actually playing in the
region - is it to ‘liberate’ or ‘oppress’ them. Whichever way you look at it, the US finds
itself in a catch-22. It becomes much more difficult to achieve the goals the sanctions
were set to achieve, and it becomes much easier for the groups the US is trying to stop to
actually strengthen their stronghold by showing the locals the predicament they find
themselves in. The unexpected consequences created by sanctions are difficult to predict.
The Iranian case study is an example of where all elements of our adopted framework are
applicable. It is also a case where the shift to multi-polarity in the system is occurring and
clearly has an impact on the effectiveness of sanctions.
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C H IN A
The study of sanctions against China provides another dynamic to the whole
research. Currently and has been explained in the Iran case study; China is part of the
transformation of the world polarity from unipolar to multipolar. As a key actor in the
current global political economy, China’s position is one that can be described as ‘the
most experienced’119. China is a country that has experienced the imposing of sanctions
and has also done the same to other countries and corporations. This experience might
explain actions that might seem to other countries in the world system as being hostile
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.

By looking at the sanctions that were imposed on China by the Soviet Union and the
United States and using the framework; it becomes clear why China takes what would be
considered a hostile or less stringent approach towards sanction policies.

Since its establishment as the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the country has
been targeted for sanctions. Mao was communist and when he led his army to overthrow
the Chinese government of the day that supported capitalist and democratic reforms. The
capitalist government then left the country to settle in, the country known today as
Taiwan. With the calculus of the communist Soviet Union, the United States sort to
contain what they believed would become a communist country. The intended
consequences of the sanctions was to deny China access to goods of strategic importance,
weaken the economy and ultimately undermine the new regime which had just
overthrown one that the US was more likely to work with
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. The objectives of denying

the China to strategic goods and weaken the economy were reasonable goals. At this time,
the 1950s, the United States was the most powerful and innovative country. It was the
119 Zhao, “Sanction Experience and Sanction Behavior.”
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hegemony of the time 122 and was still the only country expanding its military reach
around the globe. The United States, was preparing for the Korean W ar at this time and
most of its forces were in the Pacific region. So denying the goods that would be strategic
was easily enforced because of the military capabilities at its disposal. The United States
dollar had by this time also established itself as the reserve currency due to the Bretton
Woods system. This meant for China to procure any goods from Europe or America it
had to buy US dollars that it was simply not going to get.
As a pre-emption of the sanctions the United States expected M ao’s Communist
Party to side with the Soviet Union in domestic and foreign policy issues but it was going
to make this very difficult. This was seen as something that could be managed through
the policy of containment; which was applied differently by the various White House
administrations between 1950 to about 1974 (When Nixon made his first official trip to
China)
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. The objective of undermining the new communist regime backfired. One of the

unintended consequences of the sanctions was the establishment of a very strong
domestic communist state. The Communist government used the sanctions imposed on it
to cultivate the spirit of nationalism and make out the United States to be a country trying
to impede development. This was the rally-round-the-flag-effect
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that the Mao regime

used to undermine any efforts within the country to divide the nation. This division of the
country would be achieved by causing economic hardships that would affect the people
who would then demand change. This demand for change would likely increase the
chances of the people on mainland China to recall the Chinese Nationalist Party back to
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government. If the intended consequences had gone according to the way the United
States had predicated - this would have been the case and China would not have been
communist during this time.
The sanctions on China by the US and its allies increased trade between the
Soviet Union and the People’s Republic. This trade which was more than 60 percent of
imports into China as well as human capital (experts, assistance) became vital to the
communists economy
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. This also proved to be a double edged sword for the Chinese

government as they were dealing with a country that was readying its own world
expansion. The Soviet Union model of communism compared with the Chinese ideology
of how it show be practiced eventually reached a crossroad. Between 1960 and 1962 the
Soviet Union became the clear competitor to the United States and the world system
became bipolar126. The Cold war was at one of its peaks and the way that these two
countries were able to show this was by having influence in countries that adopted the
same economic philosophies as they did. Due to the large trade exchanges between China
and the Soviet Union - it was Khrushchev’s and M oscow’s aim to show China the way to
practice communism. This policy was rejected by China, which insisted it would practice
its own version of communism which did not include exporting it to other nations around
the world (as the Soviet Union was aiming to do)
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. This was also the time the Soviet

Union was pursuing an aggressive nuclear setup in Cuba that would eventually lead to the
Bay of Pigs debacle.
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Due to the escalations of political and ideological conflict between China and the
Soviet Union, sanctions were imposed on China

128

. The Soviet Union under Khrushchev

had the ambition of expanding the Russian brand of communism and coexisting with
capitalism under the policy of detente - what is usually referred to as the Grand Design
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Due to having disagreements, that became public and embarrassing for the Soviet Union,
they decided to apply sanctions so as to bend the Chinese resolve o f following their own
communist policies. Sanction imposed by the US and then the Soviet Union meant that
China was isolated and had to begin to fend for itself. This is what both these countries
thought and predicted would happen hence the unintended and unexpected consequences.
One unintended consequence was China’s resolve to become completely self-reliant
something that was not of many countries due to the wars that had taken place. Premier
Zhou Enlai initiated a policy that stated that China would never have to rely on its
enemies, in this case the US and China, for products the People’s Republic required

130

.

The Chinese government survived these sanctions by encouraging its people to reduce,
reuse and recycle, to participate in production and sustaining the local economy by
becoming more innovative

131

. The government was then going to protect these gains and

ensure that China’s economy grew throughout the Cold W ar period.

The other sanction experience that makes China a very unique country is when
trade restrictions and suspensions were imposed due to the Tiananmen Square incident.
These sanctions were imposed after China’s military, massacred 5000 university students
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who carried out pro-democracy protests, with the intention to establish order

132

. This was

seen as a human rights violation and the US among other countries imposed a broad
range of sanctions with the aim of changing its domestic policies

133

. This imposing of

sanctions brought to the surface the differences in how China and the United States
viewed world problems and more importantly the meaning of sovereignty. One of the
unintended consequences in this episode of sanctions was the unequivocal stance China
was going to have with regards to domestic policy. This can be summed up by the
Chinese Communist Party’s General Secretary, Jiang Zemin who said, “The concepts of
Human Rights, democracy and freedom are all relative and specific ones... they have to
be determined by the specific national situation of different countries” 134. For the Chinese
Communist party the US sanctions against them were perceived as an attempt to
undermine the legitimacy of the government and have direct influence in the construction
of domestic policy

135

. This was seen as disrespecting the sovereignty of China and its

people.
China responded to these sanctions by being defiant and claiming that the
sanctions (arms embargo) against them were not in line with the reality o f the tim e136.
They also did what they had done the first time to continue to develop more economic
partners so as offset the effect of the sanctions. China went as far as opening trade
contacts with India after three decades in the hope of obtaining technology for use in
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agriculture, services and public administration

137

. Due to its insistence of non

interference by western countries in domestic policy and the growing influence of the
Chinese economy the US no longer saw any benefit to impose sanctions. One of the
greatest concerns from the United States perspective was evident in President Bush’s (89’)
statement were he called for a “reasoned, careful action, that takes into account both our
long-term interests and recognition of a complex internal situation in China.” 138 This
statement from the President of the United States shows the level of uncertainty and
conviction that the administration had in relation to the sanctions imposed on China.
From this perspective, while the United States were going to show the world that they
were champions of human rights and freedom - they did not want to destroy a
relationship that had taken so long to build. With China’s increasing importance in Asia,
it was clear from the US point of view that the cost-benefit analysis overall was not in
their favor.

Interestingly, China has been subject to sanctions that have been considered
successful. However, these sanctions were imposed due to China’s involvement in the
proliferation of missile weapons. China was selling missiles to Iran and the United States
saw this as a threat to its national security
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. The United States Congress passed the

Missile Technology Control Act (MTCA) in 1990 with the intention to impose sanctions
on China and force them to agree to the over non-proliferation of weapons. The sanctions
imposed were to ensure that China’s trade relationships with countries that were
considered US adversaries, such as Iran, were not going to use the technology and
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weapons traded140. These sanctions mainly targeted specific Chinese companies that were
involved in the selling military hardware and technology but did not apply to the broad
economy141. The United States was primarily concerned with its own security and the
Chinese government was cooperative with these sanctions as they realized that this could
affect their trade relations with the biggest economy at the time. It was also during this
period that leaders in China realized that economic seclusion had been a costly mistake
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To survive the new world of globalization that was being promoted by the United States,
China had to trade and become economically strong so as to compete and engage with
other countries. In doing so it became obvious that there biggest customer was the United
States. Critical to maintaining a good trading relationship is recognizing the values that
your largest trading partner holds as a standard - one of these was and still is its national
security. For the Chinese, the United States security concerns had nothing to do with its
own internal politics and for this reason there was no need to be uncooperative with
sanctions imposed. One of the important, steps the Chinese government took was to
educate Chinese Officials with the export and import compliance laws.143 This would
ensure that China did not trade with actors that would violate US laws and security fears.
Based on China’s reaction to the sanctions imposed by the US and those it has
advocated, the unexpected consequences of the sanctions manifest in two clear ways. The
first was that China’s economic emergence during this period had a direct economic
impact on companies around the world and in the US. Secondly, China would over the
years to this day have a parallel view with how sanctions should be applied and what they
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should affect. With its economic emergence and currently the largest economic trading
country in the world144 - a status it just obtained - China’s economic importance is
something that many companies as well as the Congress in America cannot ignore. The
isolation experience of sanctions by China is the most important unexpected consequence
that the US and the Soviet Union ignored. It is this isolation that I believe allowed China
to watch from the sideline while it was developing. By observing from the sidelines it
knows exactly what to expect and how to avoid being in the same position again. Chinese
history rarely makes the same mistakes twice and with this calculus in mind China as a
country that has a major say in the coming multipolar world becomes a crucial player in
determining the effectiveness of any sanctions imposed by a country or organization
around the world.

144 The Economist. "Crowning the Dragon."
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T H E C O N C L U S IO N
The three case studies above allow me to predict the future of sanctions and how
world polarity is likely to have a major role in determining the most effective types of
sanctions to use. Sanctions are still he best tool superpowers and world or regional
organizations can use to influence the economic and political outcomes in a target
country or region. They are still the best alternative to any form of warfare. But it is up to
the countries or organizations imposing them to ensure that the intended consequences
are achieved with minimal unintended and unexpected consequences. It is also up to the
imposing countries or organizations to realize when the sanctions being imposed are no
longer effective or are bringing about more escalation to a political or economic situation
rather than agreement. W hether or not the imposing country (or organization) decides to
cancel the sanctions or reduce them will depend on the world political climate of the time.

The first factor to consider when assessing the potential to successfully use
sanctions against a target country is to determine their regime type. In this thesis South
Africa, Iran and China were chosen to illustrate three common types of regimes likely to
be seen in the future. South Africa during the Cold War era was technically a democracy,
even though it oppressed the black population in its country. Iran is a theocracy built on
authoritarian and democratic principles. China is an authoritarian country with a
communist political ideology. The results of this study suggest that achieving the
intended consequences in these countries could be a problem if the sanctions are imposed
by a country with different political and economic structures. In addition, to achieve the
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intended consequences, the imposing country must craft sanctions that do not forcibly
alter the core ideology of the regime in the target country.
South African sanctions against apartheid were largely successful because the intended
consequences could be initiated within the regime. Even though it was an apartheid
regime, within the elite changing policy was relatively democratic. Put simply,
democratic countries or regimes (with a democratic setup) are likely to be more
vulnerable to economic and political sanctions compared to authoritarian counter
examples145. This could also explain why the freedom fighter movement in South Africa
headed by the Africa National Congress (ANC), kept petitioning the US to intervene.
Even though the black majority could not externally force the democratic processes
within the Apartheid regime to begin the movement towards reform; pressure from a
white-government abroad could be the catalyst required. This is true increasingly for
almost all countries when you begin to include the world polarity calculus. Economic and
political coercion in South Africa became attainable by the sanctions imposed by
Congress, United Nations and many other countries because people within the apartheid
regime that the policy was harming the nation. Even though sanctions are imposed from
the outside, the South African case study confirms that they work from the inside out146.
The intended consequences of sanctions in South Africa were largely successful because
within the ranks of the apartheid were people such as F.W De Klerk who were motivated
by the sanctions to move towards desegregation. With more economic and political
pressure it became easier for De Klerk to challenge for the South African presidency and
then implement the intended consequences o f the sanctions.
145 Major; “Timing is Everthing”
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This is not the case with Iran and China. The intended consequences become
much more difficult to attain when the target country is not the same (or similar) to the
imposing country or organization in structure. For example, consider the way elections
are held in Iran and China. In Iran’s case, elections are not a true democratic process the Ayatollah has to approve of the candidates running for office. The people in Iran
choose a president from a list rather than from personal campaigning. In China, the
communist party chooses the leaders who are on the Politburo who create economic and
political policy without any input from the people.
In Iran, the Ayatollah as the Supreme leader is able to manipulate the instruments
of domestic loyalty based on religion to create a rally-around-the-flag effect that portrays
the imposing country or organization as one that is trying to destroy the country. Once
you add this to the history of a country like the US in the region, you begin to see all the
unintended consequences that could possibly be avoided in a country like South Africa. If
the portrayal of the imposing actor seems inadequate, the Ayatollah can use the military
as an agent to crack down on protest the sanctions might have encouraged (e.g. Green
Revolution). In China the unintended consequences would be manifested by the disregard
for human rights. Any protest that is likely to threaten the stability in the country will be
crushed in the name of peace. Compared to the US, China does not have to answer
questions of accountability or justifying its actions to the world because it is still seen as
an emerging power that is not explicitly trying to shape the systems outcomes. China is
more concerned with improving its economy and ensuring that its people are
economically satisfied. If people are economically satisfied they have less on an incentive
to concern themselves with the politics of their country. The increase of China’s
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participation in the world economy also becomes an issue that the Western Liberal world
cannot ignore. If China’s contribution to the global economy increases, other major
economic actors that have real influence in the world will be more concerned with
maintaining economic dialogue (hoping that they might achieve some form of concession)
rather than openly challenge China’s political stance on any set o f sanctions against a
target country.
The unintended consequences would manifest differently for each country; but
they often stem from the experience the target country had had with them. This is
something that imposing actors seem to acknowledge yet also ignore at the same time.
While most actors that impose sanctions acknowledge the experience a target country has
had with sanctions, policy makers are always convinced that they are always the most
effective way to bring about the desired outcomes. In achieving a unipolar role, the
country that does so, shapes the international rules and guiding principles of doing
business or handling political issues in its own structural setup. What you then begin to
see is a persistent friction between the country imposing sanctions and the target country
that can use its experience with sanctions to create nationalist opposition to them. This
friction is what usually precipitates the unintended consequences. For example, the
World Bank and IMF are the major systematic monetary lenders. The conditions attached
to loans have always been western in nature: democracy, human rights and liberation of
the economy (less government intervention). These principles might be in line with a
target country or they might be seen as incompatible or even threatening. A country like
South Africa had nowhere else to turn once the United States Congress imposed the
sanctions. The United States was its main supplier of nuclear technology and assistance.
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Its only other option was going to be the Soviet Union, but this would probably have
meant a complete overhaul of American products and technology. This would cost
money and during the 1980’s it became clear that they were no longer a leading
economic power that could support countries involved in the Cold War calculus. South
Africa’s only option was to concede defeat and reform so as to avoid more economic
damage. The unintended consequences could not materialize.
This is not the case with Iran and China. The Ayatollah’s new Iranian government
attitude towards the US was both political and cultural because of the United States’
support of the last Iranian Shah. The Ayatollah as well as the IRGC used any form of
economic coercion as propaganda to fuel Iranian nationalism. The new Iranian elite
attempting to preserve their status had to look for alternative forms to ensure that the
people did not rise up against the government. People who tried were tortured or in some
cases killed. People who supported the government and Supreme Leader were rewarded
with a subsidized standard of living that had negative impacts on the economy. This
resulted in high inflation rates and shortages in vital commodities such as petroleum
(something that Iran produces). To negate these economic problems, the government
asked for assistance from China and engaged the black market for vital products such as
petroleum
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. This attempt to regulate the economy led to the IRGC becoming more

involved in Iran’s economy. This creates another set of unexpected consequences for the
imposing country when they decide to reduce or remove the sanctions. If sanctions are
removed (or reduced), and the IRGC (and the Iranian government) have invested heavily
in businesses on the black market; the IRGC will not easily let go of that lucrative
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business. They are particularly likely to resist the approach by any President who might
be interested in thawing relations between Iran and the West. This would also be the case
for other members of the Iranian elite who have done the same in other niches of
businesses that the sanctions allowed them to reap huge profits.
The unintended and unexpected consequences are especially important when you
compare the Chinese case study to the other two case studies. This comparison also
suggests that current events in Crimea could easily have been predicted but not avoided.
Like Iran and South Africa, China has been subject to sanctions by the United States. The
different sanctions targeted different political and economic issues from human rights to
intellectual property. Whenever China felt its national integrity and sovereignty was
threatened, it stayed resolute. When the sanctions after Tiananmen Square were
announced, China made it clear to the countries imposing those sanctions that China’s
problems were for China alone to resolve and that they would not bend to intervention
from the outside.

However, whenever the sanctions where economic, it was more likely that China
would be more conciliatory, because the only way China could survive was by engaging
in world trade. The important thing to gain from the Chinese case study is that the
sanctions put China and the US on a collision course, considering that the US was on an
economic and political decline while China was on the rise. W ith its rise as a great
economic actor, China has become a model other countries imitate partly due to its new
position as global creditor. More countries that rely on aid and foreign direct investment
have come to see China as a viable alternative source. This is amplified when you look at
the role China has played on the sanctions imposed by the US on Iran. In 2007, a Chinese
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ambassador stated that the relevant sanction measures imposed should neither harm the
Iranian people nor affect normal economic, trade and financial exchanges between Iran
and other counties. 148 In 2009 China signed $14.5 billion worth of contracts with Iran to
help expand two existing oil refineries to produce more gasoline domestically149. This
type of aid undercuts any form of sanctions the US or UN might impose on Iran.
China’s foreign aid is known to come without any political conditions that would
affect recipients’ the structure of government or culture. This is probably due to the
experiences they had when sanctions were placed on them by the US and the Soviet
Union during the Cold W ar years. With their share of investment increasing around the
world it inherently becomes part of the Chinese DNA to protect them. This has meant
investing in economic and military capabilities that would allow them to be in that
position. The China Development Bank, which facilitates China’s cross-border
investment and global-business cooperation,150 is becoming a key rival to many of the
western international institutions such as the World Bank and IMF. In such a situation,
the economic advantage of placing a broad range of sanctions becomes much more
difficult because the target countries can substitute their source of development funds.
This is also why China has invested in military modernization to be able to reach areas
where their investments might be at risk. This is exactly what Long Cycle theory predicts
for rising great powers.

The unexpected consequences begin to emerge when it becomes increasingly
clear that the hegemonic imposing country (or organization) can no longer coerce over

148 Van Kemenade, “China vs. the Western Campaign for Iran Sanctions.”
149 ibid
150 China Development Bank; http://www.cdb.com.cn/english/
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rising powers like China to support its set of the sanctions. For example, as the largest
trading country in the world, China does business with anyone and everyone. This is not
the same for most US individuals or companies around the world due to the development
of “ Smart Sanctions” . American companies in particular have a stake in the Chinese
economy but they are restricted in what types of businesses they can conduct without
breaking the law. When sanctions are implemented today, they affect every American
company and any company that has an American citizen as an employee.151 Current US
sanctions, increase America’s jurisdiction and this is can affect companies in ways that
are likely to disrupt business

152

. An international transaction whose destination is a target

country could substantially cost a company or its subsidiaries more in legal fees this
increases with the complexity of sanctions. The new forms of sanctions that the US has
adopted are much more complex and could involve lawsuits from the Commerce,
Treasury and the Justice department at once, or separately, depending on the situation

153

.

These types of regulations are difficult for multinational companies to avoid which
discourages international business. Hence, the effect of sanctions will be felt in the home
country as well because they might not be sure if the company they are selling their
product to in China is reselling to a buyer in a sanctioned country such as Iran. One of the
unexpected consequences is that the imposing country might not receive support from its
allies because the sanctions are putting unnecessary pressures on companies that are vital
to the United States’ allies’ economies. W ith more economic integration and emergence
of rising nations, the economic capabilities that made a hegemon effective in imposing
sanctions in a unipolar world no longer have the same effect. While the US is still
151 Buretta, & Mackintosh. "U.S. Trade Sanctions: The Threat of Local Enforcement of Federal Sanctions."
152 ibid
153 ibid
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identified as the strongest in the system it does not necessarily mean it can effectively
influence the outcomes in the world.
A country like China would never support this type of infringement on their
companies and would become less inclined to do business with US persons or entities.
From the Chinese perspective, the US is not the powerful country it was twenty years ago
and that type of infringement is not worth the risk. From the American companies’
perspective, their business opportunities are becoming more limited due to the fact that
Chinese, Russian (or any other country’s companies) might not follow the sanction
procedures that the US, EU or even UN have implemented.

83

T H E P R E D IC T IO N ...
Understanding world polarity is crucial to analyzing systematic trends we see in
the world today. The gravity model helps explain that as a country’s economy begins to
expand it increases its multilateral trade with countries that have large economies. China,
the US, the EU and Russia are among the top five trading partners today. Long and
Power Cycle theories explain that as countries grow economically it becomes virtually
inevitable for them to desire to increase their military strength.

Parallels are usually drawn between the dynamics in 1914 and those happening today in
2014.154 A comparison between the political and economic similarities of the United
Kingdom and Germany’s differences laid side by side to the ones between the United
States and China. I would go further and expand this parallel comparison as the
differences between the US and China as well as Russia. In 1914, the world was
multipolar. The identified superpowers were Britain, Germany, US and France. The
differences between Britain and Germany led to the First World War. History seems to
suggest that a world that is multipolar has all the ingredients to start a war, which would
then determine the new superpowers. This might not be the case this time because an
inter-state war between great powers today would be fundamentally disadvantageous to
everyone involved. It is also likely that sanctions will suffer as well. Rather than having a
world war we will see more counter-posed sanctions (in effect, a kind of economic
warfare were countries impose sanctions on one another till they reach an agreement).

154 Evans; "Before the First World War: What Can 1914 Tell Us About 2014?"
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Russia recently annexed Crimea from the Ukraine and the US and the EU
responded with sanctions.155 The US Executive issued executive orders that would ensure
that if the Secretaries of the Treasury, State and Commerce concluded that a Russian
individual had helped the Russian Government facilitate the annexation of Crimea and
escalation of violence in the Ukraine then that individual should not have access to any
US assets156. This action was swiftly followed by a reaction from Russia that froze assets
in their country.

157

It has become increasingly clear that the United States’ EU allies are

hesitant to impose the amount or level of sanctions as the US.
When you analyze the situation further you begin to observe why the cracks have
shown up. Russia is the EU ’s largest single supplier of gas products at 30 percent

158

. Any

sanctions that are deemed truly harmful from a Russian point of view could mean
restricting energy supplies to Western Europe. This would cause a shock on the EU and
one of its largest trading partners - the US. When you look at the US sanctions in depth,
one will notice that they only affect people serving in the Russian government and some
banks that have assets of individuals supporting President Putin. The US knows that
imposing sanctions that would actually cripple some part of the Russian economy would
anger their EU allies. The intended consequences would not be met; and even if they
were, Russia has already annexed Crimea - irreversible at this point. The unintended
consequences could be significant, including disorder in the region due to possible riots
over the increase of gas prices if the Russian government began to choke supply. The
unintended consequence would be political isolation for the US government as well as

155 BBC, ECONOMIST
156 Treasury - US Executive Orders 1366/1/2/3/4
157 BBC/ECONOMIST
158
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many US companies such as Visa and Mastercard that would be sanctioned by Russia for
carrying out US directives to withhold and deny access to cross-border funds.
Given the analysis of this study, such a scenario is exactly what we should expect
to see in the realm of sanctions. While many will argue that the Iranian sanctions are
becoming more successful,159 there is an unexpected consequence often left out: the
different domestic-political climate within the countries involved. The sanctions imposed
by the US (and organizations that it influences) uncertain in duration, make it very
difficult to know whether sanctions will be temporary or permanent, which reduces their
credibility. It is one thing for the president to drop sanctions and rescind executive orders,
it is not a given that Congress will do the same. Unlike South Africa apartheid sanctions
where the Congress was in agreement - today provides a different political landscape.
China and Russia, may avoid the US deadlock problem because o f their authoritarian
political structure (which will support the Politburo and President Putin respectively).
When and where quick action is necessary to go around sanctions - they are relatively
quicker and can offer more assurances to countries that request for assistance. This is
contrast to the US because the President can say one thing and the Congress something
completely different.

For now the US is still the superpower; it has the largest military and defense
budget compared to the next eleven to thirteen countries combined.160 The US also still
has the most advanced technology, services, and goods that many countries, companies
and individuals want and need. The US is still the single most crucial player in the world

159 BBC. "Q&A: Iran Sanctions."
160 The Economist. "The Military Balance."
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economy. The comparative advantage the US has over up and coming powers such as
China and Russia is still significant. However, this is likely to change in the future.
Trading with the US will become like trading with any other country in history; in time,
others will offer the same quality of technology, services and goods. In such multipolarity,
the US or organizations it uses to influence political and economic outcome, will become
much less dominant. Countries that have made fewer demands, and have not infringed on
the political structure of other countries (such as China and Russia), will gain influence
and be major alternative centers of political power and the economic interaction.
Sanctions will still be used. Russia and China have shown that they will continue
to use them. But the efficacy of anyone trying to use sanctions in a multipolar world is
fundamentally reduced. Those who do so will have to create sanction policies that both
produce intended consequences and avoid the unintended and unexpected consequences
that might arise. This will not make the world a safer place; it will add more systemic
volatility and uncertainty as countries pursue national interests. Avoidance of the effects
of US sanctions will be easier and more common. As in 1914, the balance of power will
be difficult to determine and while the integrated economy might act to stabilize the
system, outcomes of particular attempts to use sanctions will be complex and ambiguous.
Sanctions are an important tool. They may still be able to help avoid inter-state war - and
they probably will when they are designed much smarter and efficiently. W ith a shift in
world polarity and the efficacy of sanctions questioned; the real question is this: What
does a multipolar world come to when sanctions imposed by great powers are neither
efficient nor effective? I do not know the answer, but I do know how increasingly critical
the question will become.
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